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ABSTRACT 
TRUST JUDGMENTS AND THE HINDSIGHT BIAS EFFECT 
Martin D. Smith-Rodden 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Director: Dr. Ivan K. Ash 
A decision to trust or not to trust can be examined within a broader category of 
cognition research concerning decisions under uncertainty. The purpose of this research 
was to investigate trust decisions through the lens of the hindsight bias effect. The 
hindsight bias effect (sometimes known as the "I knew it all along" effect) is a 
consequence that often follows judgments under uncertainty. Two experiments examined 
participants' evaluations of trust outcomes to determine if and how judgments of trust 
might be susceptible to hindsight biases. Experiment 1 exposed participants to vignettes 
depicting a third-party trust transaction between friends, with outcomes of varying 
degrees of surprise. Experiment 2 replicated this with a different vignette and improved 
balance in the experimental manipulation. Hindsight bias effects for judgments of trust 
and corresponding patterns in memory distortions were observed, as predicted under the 
sense-making models of hindsight bias. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an uncertain world and a highly interdependent society, trust is one of the most 
prized qualities in many interpersonal relationships (Barber, 1983; Rempel, Holmes, & 
Zanna, 1985). Trust is said to be "a psychological state composing the intention to accept 
vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). It has been the subject of scholarly 
examination and research across many disciplines in the behavioral sciences including 
sociology, business studies, economics and a number of branches within psychology that 
include motivational, developmental, personality, cognitive and organizational 
psychology (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Lewicki, Bunker, & Rubin, 1995; Rousseau, et 
al., 1998). What social scientists learn from people's views toward trust, as well as any 
trust-related decisions and outcomes, can be of great benefit to society in general (Rotter, 
1967; Rousseau, et al., 1998). 
The current body of literature has shown us that trust is a multi-dimensional 
concept and research has developed into three distinct directions of examination 
(Lewicki, et al., 1995; Worchel, 1979). The first branch of research belongs to the 
personality theorists. This research tradition concentrates on an individual's generalized 
disposition or set of expectancies toward trust behaviors, amounting to a trait condition 
that may be learned through experiences (Rotter, 1967, 1971, 1980) or resulting from 
events during previous developmental stages (Bowlby, 1969). A second research tradition 
is driven by sociologists and economists, where trust is examined as an institutional 
phenomenon, conceptualizing trust or distrust between and within institutions and groups 
Journal of Applied Psychology was used as the journal model for this manuscript. 
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(see Farrell & Hardin, 2004, for an excellent examination of this view). A third 
perspective is social psychological, which focuses on transactional trust models. From 
this view, trust is believed to evolve from an individual's or a group's set of situational 
expectations or judgments about the behavior of another, often within the context of a 
specific relationship (Barber, 1983; Boon & Holmes, 1991; Good, 1991; Hardin, 2002; 
Lewicki, et al., 1995). 
Theorists who examine the transactional model of trust seek to examine the 
fundamentals regarding the intricate conditions, contexts and cognitions which in turn 
drive people's trust judgments, behaviors and relationships (Hardin, 2002). One of the 
most frequently discussed fundamentals of trust is the element of risk. The inclusion of a 
word such as "vulnerability" in the definition of trust implies that elements of risk, 
consequence and uncertainty are inherent in trust judgments and transactions (Boon & 
Holmes, 1991; Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Lewicki, et al., 1995; Rempel, et al., 1985; 
Rotter, 1967, 1980; Rousseau, et al., 1998). In this light, decisions to trust or not to trust 
can be examined as judgments under uncertainty, in which people, through use of 
problem-solving predictive cognitions, try to make determinations about the probability 
of an outcome for a future event (Boon & Holmes, 1991; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982). This can be easily applied to trust. If a trustor's predictive judgment deems a 
target to be considered trustworthy, then they will be extended trust, which always means 
a certain assumption of vulnerability on the part of the trustor. People who make such 
risk-laden decisions under uncertain conditions may be prone to systematic and 
sometimes predictable errors, both before the judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) 
and after, as they reflect on the consequences of their judgments (Fischhoff, 1992). It is 
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the latter that is of particular interest in the context of this research. It is the latter, the 
examination of how trust judgments are processed under conditions of uncertainty, that is 
the focus of the present research. 
Judgments of Trust 
During a decision under uncertain conditions, such as a judgment of trust, a 
person may make a predictive judgment as to whether a person is trustworthy or not, 
based on a variety of reasons and information. During this task, they can engage in such 
problem solving through use of heuristic mechanisms (i.e., a person's habitual, cognitive 
rules) which are often driven by biases in perception and judgment (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). When judging under uncertain circumstances, mental shortcuts result 
in quick, reasonable and sound judgments. However, because heuristic thinking is bias-
laden and operates independently of data-driven, objective or reliable decision criteria 
and cognitions, it is not uncommon for an individual to make an error in judgment 
(Kruglanski, 1983). 
Because trust decisions, as judgments under uncertainty, are susceptible to biasing 
and errors, such judgments may occasionally lead to unanticipated, surprising, 
disappointing or even grievous outcomes (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Koehler & 
Gershoff, 2003; Rotter, 1980; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). When viewed in 
reflection or hindsight, individuals have powerful opportunities to learn from these trust 
experiences and what is learned may shape future decisions (Olekalns & Smith, 2005). 
As an example, consider the first vignette presented in Appendix A. Mark (a 
trustor), may evaluate the trustworthiness of Jim (a target) for repayment of a small 
monetary loan. The decision as to whether to not to extend trust toward Jim in making a 
loan may be influenced by a number of elements. Mark may weigh factors of Jim's 
dependability and predictability, as well as the level of faith he has in Jim's willingness to 
uphold his end of the trust transaction (Rempel, et al., 1985). Also, likability has been 
implicated in theories of both social persuasion (Cialdini, 1993) as well as trust (Levine, 
2003) as a factor that may moderate or influence decisions to trust. 
Furthermore, as Mark deliberates the decision to trust Jim, he may do so through 
use of the availability heuristic, where information readily accessible and easily brought 
to mind is used to make a predictive determination regarding the target's likelihood of 
upholding a trust obligation (i.e. repayment of the debt). Because the availability heuristic 
operates only on information that can be quickly and easily assessed or recalled, the 
judgment of trust may fail to take into account other decision criteria, such as factors of 
probability and frequency (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). For instance, Mark believes that 
he can probably trust his friend Jim for any number of reasons. So then, Mark may loan 
Jim money, based on recent personal history, friendship or kindred spirits - forgetting or 
discounting that Jim has had lapses in integrity in his dealings with others, struggles with 
finances and bill paying, can be moody, unpredictable and otherwise unreliable at times. 
It is possible a full examination of all the evidence, when considered empirically or 
objectively, might put into question the target's history, ability or inclinations toward 
repaying debts. When viewed through a less bias-laden lens, it might not be surprising if 
Jim ultimately fails to repay the debt to Mark. 
Once a person has made a judgmental error following a failed heuristic, feelings 
of surprise or disappointment may invite reflective thought or a metacognitive monitoring 
of one's own memory of the initial judgment, in hope of learning or adapting (Flavell, 
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1992; Nelson, 1992). In such a retrospective judgment, one might hope to recall the 
original conditions, criteria and cognitions that formed the decision. One might then 
objectively reevaluate and adapt to make better future decisions. Considering the personal 
investment made in the decision to trust (in addition to other costs), a negative outcome 
would yield significant negative affect (Koehler & Gershoff, 2003). Therefore one would 
expect such an after-the-fact evaluation to receive hardy cognitive effort (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). 
Based on the accuracy and soundness of a person's memory, one might hope that 
the predictive and retrospective judgments are in accord; that the retrospection in 
hindsight is a veridical recollection or representation of the original prediction made in 
foresight, so that one might analyze and learn from the misadventure. Regrettably, we 
know that this may not always be the case. 
The Hindsight Bias Effect 
Many researchers have examined the effects that occur to our recollections of past 
judgments after receiving outcome information about a decision made under uncertain 
conditions (Fischhoff, 2007). People often claim to have known all along that an outcome 
was predictable after the fact, regardless of whether they could have or in fact did predict 
it beforehand. Early on, some psychologists questioned this seemingly self-flattering bias 
on the part of people's recollections regarding their own predictive abilities: "If we're so 
prescient, why aren't we running the world?" (Fischhoff, 2007, p. 10). 
The hindsight bias effect, sometimes referred to as the "I knew it all along" 
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effect,1 is "the tendency for individuals with outcome knowledge (hindsight) to claim that 
they would have estimated a probability of occurrence for the reported outcome that is 
higher than they would have estimated in foresight (without the outcome information)" 
(Hawkins & Hastie, 1990, p. 311). 
In his seminal article on hindsight bias, Fischhoff (1975) coined the phrase 
"creeping determinism" to describe a non-deliberate tendency for people to believe or 
proclaim a reported outcome to have been inevitable. In his series of experiments that 
measured reactions toward unfamiliar historic, news or case-history vignettes, Fischhoff 
(1975) found a consistent and largely unconscious propensity for people to overestimate 
the predictability of outcomes when compared to their own original predictions. 
Hindsight bias is a ubiquitous effect influencing decisions made under uncertainly 
(Fischhoff, 1975) that has been found across a variety of situations, domains (Guilbault, 
Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004) and even cultures (Pohl, Bender, & Lachmann, 
2002). Scholars have studied hindsight bias in a multitude of situations and conditions, 
focusing on types of outcomes, expertise, types of events or tasks, personal relevance or 
importance, positive or negative outcomes and experimental manipulations to increase or 
decrease hindsight bias (Guilbault, et al., 2004). Applied research has highlighted its 
manifestations in numerous types of consequential decisions, such as stock trading 
(Mark, Boburka, Eyssell, Cohen, & Mellor, 2003), political elections (Blank, Fischer, & 
Erdfelder, 2003), victim blaming (Janoff-Bulman, Timko, & Carli, 1985; Maurer & 
Robinson, 2008), legal outcomes (Harley, 2007; Wasieleski, Whatley, & Murphy, 2009), 
1 While the terms are used interchangeably in most literature, some research and 
theoretical explorations have operationally differentiated a Hindsight Bias Effect from an 
"I knew it all along effect." See Pezzo (2003) for a thoughtful elaboration on this. 
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medical diagnoses (Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Chapman, Elstein, & 
Sonnenberg, 2000; Dawson, et al., 1988), malpractice judgments (Dawson, et al., 1988) 
and decisions in forensic psychiatry (LeBourgeois, Pinals, Williams, & Appelbaum, 
2007). While some theorists explore this bias through a self-affirming or motivational 
framework (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990) many researchers dating back to Fischhoff (1975) 
view this effect as operating outside of people's awareness or perception, which lends 
support to theories that focus on hindsight bias as an "automatic" cognitive effect. 
Furthermore, researchers posit that the hindsight bias is a potentially harmful effect due 
to the apparent memory failure regarding one's own prediction decisions, as well as a 
sense of mistaken determinism. It follows, logically, that one is unlikely to learn from 
decisions if they are unable to recall them accurately (Fischhoff, 1992), or if one deludes 
oneself that unanticipated outcomes are clearly inevitable and were more predictable than 
they in fact were (Blank, Musch, & Pohl, 2007; Dawson, et al., 1988; Fischhoff, 2007; 
Hoch & Loewenstein, 1992). 
Applying Hindsight bias to trust 
Considering the money loan scenario discussed in the earlier section, an example 
of a retrospective judgment showing the hindsight bias effect in post-betrayal might be 
Mark claiming: "I knew I probably couldn't trust Jim to repay the money." In fact, 
according to the hindsight bias effect, Mark may or may not have foreseen Jim's loan 
default in his predictive judgment, or with such a degree of certainty as he stated after the 
fact. 
There is much in the respective literature traditions of both trust and hindsight 
bias that suggests many points of intersection between the two theoretical frameworks, 
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not the least of which is the shared foundation regarding people's decisions under 
uncertainty. Yet, despite a recent line of largely theoretical literature examining themes of 
betrayal and trust evaluation (Tomlinson, et al., 2004) and despite the many and diverse 
examinations of hindsight bias, little if any scholarly examination has focused on both 
hindsight bias and trust. Given the lengthy background of research in these areas, a 
thorough examination of trust decisions from a social cognition perspective - through the 
lens of decision making under uncertainty and highlighting the hindsight bias effect -
could serve to fill this interesting and surprising gap in the literature. 
As with any judgment under uncertainty, the available information with which to 
make a predictive judgment may vary in quality and quantity. Information can vary in the 
degrees to whether it supports a specific outcome (a congruent condition), or fails to 
support an outcome (an incongruent condition). Also, the pre-outcome information may 
neither support nor refute a specific prediction as to whether an outcome will happen (an 
ambivalent condition). These conditions can lead to varying degrees of surprise at an 
outcome. In a series of studies, Ash (2009) developed a repeated-measures design 
following such a model, where the pre-outcome information available to participants was 
controlled to manipulate the degree of surprise they felt after learning an outcome. 
Participants' predictions of outcomes to sports vignettes were measured and 
experimenters found evidence of hindsight bias effects in the incongruent and ambivalent 
scenarios, but not for the congruent condition. 
This lent support to certain cognitive reconstructive theories known as the sense-
making models for hindsight bias (Ash, 2009; Nestler, Blank, & von Collani, 2008; 
Nestler & von Collani, 2008; Pezzo, 2003). Cognitive reconstruction theories are a family 
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of hindsight bias explanations that place emphasis on the formative or reconstructive 
nature of human memory. These theories posit that, when people are tasked to recall an 
event, they do not retrieve a memory in any literal sense. Instead, they reconstruct the 
memory from the sampling evidence, which is available in long term memory (Hawkins 
& Hastie, 1990). This is to say that the cognitions, opinions and imagery that constitute 
episodal memory are re-formed at that moment of retrospection (see Ash, 2009, for a 
review of these diverse theories). As explained in the sense-making theories of hindsight 
bias, a surprising outcome may result in activating sense-making cognitions on the part of 
the individual. Sense-making has been defined as a set of motivated, sustained, 
explanatory or problem-solving cognitions that occurs as an individual takes note of an 
event and then is moved to interpret, appraise and satisfactorily explain the event 
(Anderson, Krull, Weiner, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 1996; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007). In an 
unanticipated outcome and especially if associated with a task failure, one may be cued 
into the engagement of a sense-making process if there are sufficient mental resources, 
motivation and time available (Anderson, et al., 1996). 
As outcome-supporting information or knowledge structures become more 
accessible in a person's memory due to the influence of the outcome itself, such 
information influences the recollection of the predictive judgment as the memory is 
reconstructed and creates the (so-called) bias. Since an outcome that is incongruent with 
pre-outcome expectations results in motivated sense-making, the outcome-supporting 
information receives additional processing. As such, it may become a more salient set of 
sampling information and therefore more easily recalled during retrospection. Therefore, 
research has shown more of a hindsight bias effect following incongruent outcomes 
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rather than after more congruent outcomes (Ash, 2009; Nestler, et al., 2008; Nestler & 
von Collani, 2008; Pezzo, 2003; Pezzo & Beckstead, 2008; Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007). 
Because hindsight bias is a ubiquitous effect found across a wide variety of 
research designs, one would expect trust decisions to yield measurable results when 
examined using established experimental methods. To begin a systematic line of 
research, a series of laboratory studies were conducted to test hindsight bias in a sequence 
of third-person trust scenarios. Additionally, the participants' generalized expectancies 
and "real world attitudes" regarding trust were examined to explore whether these traits 
influenced their judgments in the laboratory setting. 
The hindsight bias, operationally defined, is comprised of a differential between 
predictive and retrospective judgments; therefore an observation of the effect seems to 
lend itself well to a repeated-measure experimental design (Ash, 2009). Pre-test and post-
test experimental designs have shown measurable and significant hindsight bias effects, 
although not usually as large as the effect sizes from between-subject designs (Guilbault, 
et al., 2004). 
To examine how the construct of trust might intersect with the hindsight bias 
effect, participants' responses to text-based scenarios, or vignettes, of a trust-based 
transaction between two unfamiliar people were examined to see if there was a resulting 
hindsight bias effect. In a previous study (Ash, 2009) effectively measured hindsight bias 
using vignette-based testing. In this research, it was found that the hindsight bias was 
observable when participants received incongruent or ambivalent pre-outcome 
information, but not when the information was congruent with the outcome. Participants 
were also able to recall significantly more outcome-supporting information when the pre-
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outcome information was incongruent, relevant to the outcome (Ash, 2009). Some of 
those paradigms were partially replicated by measuring participants' prediction and 
retrospection responses to witnessing dyadic trust transactions between unknown third 
parties. Specifically, hindsight bias effects regarding perceptions of trustworthiness were 
measured under a variety of expectancy conditions, such as the incongruent, congruent 
and ambivalent scenarios, to examine differences in effects due to influence of post-
outcome sense-making that were brought on by the metacognitive condition of surprise. 
Though a dominant topic of interest in most hindsight research concerns distortions of 
probability regarding various outcomes (Blank, et al., 2007; Fischhoff, 2007; Guilbault, 
et al., 2004), this study may be the first to focus on how hindsight effects might change 
perceptions of trustworthiness. 
First, if trust decisions would fall under the category of judgments under 
uncertainty and because judgments under uncertainty often yield hindsight bias effects, 
then (Hi) significant hindsight bias effects would be observed during judgments of trust. 
Secondly (H2), based on previous research involving hindsight bias, it was predicted that 
significant hindsight effects would be observed in both incongruent and ambivalent 
conditions, where a participant might engage in successful sense-making cognitions that 
have been linked to yielding hindsight bias effects. It was anticipated that no hindsight 
bias effects would be detected among participants exposed to "congruent" conditions, 
where participants did not attempt to make sense of an expected outcome, since the 
outcome fell within the person's set of prior-outcome expectancies (Ash, 2009; Nestler, 
et al., 2008; Nestler & von Collani, 2008; Pezzo, 2003; Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007) 
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A series of exploratory measures were employed in this study. A free recall 
memory task was administered to participants, as well as two inventories measuring 
generalized dispositions for interpersonal trust: the Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS, Rotter, 
1971, 1991) and the Revised Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (RPHN, Wrightsman, 
1991, 1992). A free recall memory task, which was administered to all participants, was 
used to investigate effects in the accessibility of outcome-supporting information. Based 
on the previous research (Ash, 2009), it was predicted that (H3) more recall of outcome-
supporting information would be observed in the incongruent or ambivalent information 
than for the congruent conditions, in concurrence to observing hindsight bias. 
To investigate how the effects of individual differences regarding trust might 
affect hindsight bias, the ITS and the RPHN were employed. These scales were used to 
determine the participants' generalized trust expectancies as a trait measure, to ascertain 
to what degree dispositions toward trust might influence a hindsight bias after witnessing 
a trust transaction. These measures were also compared against other measures in the 
design, in an exploration for trends and influences. 
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PILOT TESTING 
Prior to beginning this series of experiments, it is necessary to have reliable 
materials with which to test participants' responses regarding their perceptions of trust in 
social transactions. To establish instrument reliability and validity on the untested 
depictions of interpersonal trust, a pilot study was conducted using an online survey to 
measure reactions to several scenarios. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-four participants were recruited from the pool of undergraduate students at 
Old Dominion University, using the form in Appendix B. The volunteers were a 
minimum of 18 years of age. Each participant received one research credit as 
compensation, disseminated through an online management tool known as the SONA 
University Student Research Participant System. The ethical guidelines of the American 
Psychological Association (A.P.A., 2002) were followed for these procedures. All studies 
in this research project were reviewed and deemed exempt by the College of Science 
Human Subjects Review Board (Appendix C). All participants received a notification 
document online regarding their rights as volunteers prior to the procedures (Appendix 
D). 
Apparatus 
A survey was constructed and administered on a university website using 
Inquisite™ survey software. Participants read four pre-outcome scenarios (Appendix A) 
that were "case history" narratives of a trust-based interaction between a pair of fictitious 
individuals. The scenarios consisted of a series of descriptive situational statements, 
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which were intended to manipulate expectations (i.e. perceptions of a target's 
trustworthiness), prior to an outcome, as determined by the content and combination of 
the sentences. These scenarios summarized the nature of the relationship and details of 
the situations: a small loan request between college roommates, a decision of a young 
professional about to confide to a colleague about a same-sex partner, the quandary of a 
small business owner in hiring a friend, or a decision of a college sophomore to tell her 
roommate a secret about an unplanned pregnancy. All of these scenarios were designed in 
an attempt to equate manipulation statements that both encouraged and discouraged 
perceptions of trustworthiness toward the target in the story. As such, the equated and 
balanced combination of trust statements in each scenario represented an ambivalent 
condition. 
Design and Procedure 
In a single-session online survey that was accessed through use of an online 
university research participation system known as SONA, the participants viewed an 
online page notifying them of details of their informed consent as a volunteer for the 
study and pending their acceptance of the document, went on to read the four pre-
outcome scenarios. After reading each scenario, participants responded to a series of 
questions. The participants' responses were measured on a seven-point Likert scale 
inventory regarding their predictions of the scenario's outcome and target 
trustworthiness, as well as item-by-item evaluations of how they may influence reactions 
among participants. A score of four equated to perceptions of neutrality regarding target 
trustworthiness. First, participants were asked whether or not they thought the trustor in 
the story would ultimately trust the target. Secondly, participants were asked if they 
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thought the target was trustworthy (our variable of interest). Next, they were asked to 
evaluate each sentence in the scenario and would indicate as to whether they believed a 
statement supported trust or distrust toward the target. After reading and responding to all 
four vignettes, the participants were debriefed in a final webpage (Appendix E) and then 
were taken to a separate site where they left information to receive participation credit. 
These pilot tests were analyzed using one-sample Mests to determine their distance from 
a midpoint rating and establish if these vignettes represented a balanced condition with 
regard to participants' perceptions of target trustworthiness. 
Results 
Of the four pre-outcome scenarios, two showed desirable central tendencies 
among participant responses in the ambivalent condition. The first was a story about a 
student who deliberated whether or not to grant a small loan to his roommate (M=3.50, 
£0=1.69). The second was a story of a small business owner who had to decide whether 
or not to hire a friend (M=3.58, £0=1.62). Responses indicated that statements that were 
designed to influence trust positively toward a target tended to be very effective in doing 
so. Participants reported that, in the money loan scenario, statements designed to support 
trust (M=5.69, SO=.27) significantly differed from a neutral response and did in fact 
foster trust toward the story's target, /(43)=16.39,/><.001. Also, responses for the money 
loaning scenario indicated that statements that were designed to support distrust (M=2.91, 
£0=.53), did act to inhibit feelings of trust toward the target, f(43)=-7.20,/K.001. For the 
small business hiring scenario, statements that were designed to encourage trust (A^5.36, 
SD=A5), similarly fostered trust in favor of the story's target, *(43)=13.10,p<.001. 
Manipulation statements that were designed to support distrust (M=2J\, SD=.56), 
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succeeded in doing so according to their reports, 7(43)=-15.18,/?<.001. Cronbach's alphas 
for the trust-focused statements for the first and second scenarios were .84 and .86 
respectively. Alphas for the distrust-focused statements were .93 and .74 for the first and 
second scenarios. When viewed in the aggregate, these responses indicated a reasonable 
to high level of reliability regarding these scenarios. These two pre-outcome scenarios, 
demonstrating two different types of interpersonal trust situations (one an interpersonal 
money loan and another being a small business employment decision) were used in the 
following series of experiments. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
The goal of this experiment was to examine whether trust judgments may be 
susceptible to hindsight bias effects as are other judgments under uncertainty. Personality 
or dispositional traits regarding trust were also explored to investigate how they might 
moderate hindsight bias effects. Participants were exposed to vignettes consisting of 
story-based scenarios and outcomes depicting decisions of interpersonal trust. Patterns of 
hindsight bias were expected during conditions of surprise or ambivalence toward an 
outcome, but not for expected outcomes. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty participants were recruited from the volunteer participant 
pool of students at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, through use of the 
SONA University Student Research Participant System. A copy of the recruitment flyer 
is found in Appendix F. They received two research credits, one for each 
appointment/hour, as compensation for their participation. The volunteers were mostly 
young adults in this convenience sample. Ninety-three percent were between the ages of 
18 and 25 and seven percent were between 26 and 45. Most participants were female 
(«=137). Ninety-six percent reported that English was their primary language; two 
percent reported that English has been their primary language for more than a decade; 
one percent stated that English has been their primary language for less than five years 
and one percent said that English is not their primary language. 
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Apparatus 
Programming system. The text-based vignettes, prediction/retrospection measures 
and the trust disposition inventories were created by using E-Prime experimental 
programming software and administered using personal computers. 
Vignettes. The vignettes were constructed "case history" style narratives, which 
depicted a trust-based interaction between two fictitious individuals detailed in Appendix 
A: a story of a small loan between roommates. Each vignette consisted of two parts: pre-
outcome scenarios and outcome scenarios. 
Pre-outcome scenarios. The pre-outcome scenarios summarized the nature of 
the relationship and different aspects of the situation surrounding a small loan request 
(Appendix G). There were four initial sentences in the vignette that provided the setting 
for the story. Following that was a set of sentences that determined the pre-outcome 
scenario. This serves as the first between-subjects independent variable, with three levels: 
trust-supporting, ambivalent and distrust-supporting. In the interest of concise and non-
cumbersome descriptions regarding the conditions, the pre-outcome levels will be 
referred to as trust/ambivalent/distrust throughout the remainder of this paper. 
The ambivalent condition was designed to have an equal number of sentences to 
support both perceptions of trust and distrust toward the target in the story. These pairs 
of pro and con reasons, or manipulation statements, addressed situational aspects and 
social-psychological factors that are theorized to influence perceptions of predictability, 
dependability, or degree of faith in the target during trust decisions. Such factors include 
social influences, relationship history with the target, perceptions of likeability, integrity, 
ability to uphold trust expectations and reputation regarding social transactions in the past 
(Barber, 1983; Levine, 2003; Rempel, et al., 1985). 
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For the trust-supporting condition, five sentences were omitted from the vignette 
that cast doubt on a target's willingness or ability to repay the loan and therefore would 
support expectations of his defection in the outcome. With fewer reasons to doubt a 
target's trustworthiness, the target would seem more trustworthy (i.e., it may seem 
apparent and expected for the target to repay the loan to the trustor). In the distrust-
supporting condition, five statements were omitted that would support an outcome of the 
loan being repaid. 
After removing five sentences from either selection, there remained 64.28% of 
information that supported either a trust or distrust-supporting outcome and 35.72% that 
discouraged it. The presentation sequence of trust-supporting and distrust-supporting 
information was counter balanced into eight orders to control for primacy and recency 
effects, while still maintaining story cohesion. 
Outcome scenario. The outcome scenarios were a short series of sentences that 
constituted a conclusion to the vignette (Appendix H). In every outcome scenario, the 
trustor in the vignette found the target trustworthy and chose to make the loan. The 
outcome scenario then presented to participants one of two possible conclusions: either 
the target paid back the loan and therefore was trustworthy, or the target failed to repay 
the loan and therefore defected. This constituted the second of the between-subjects 
independent variables: the vignette's outcome scenario, with two levels: (target is) 
trustworthy/ defection. Again, for the sake of brevity in the descriptions, references that 
follow for those two outcome levels will be trust/distrust for the remainder of this paper. 
A full map of all the vignettes, with pre-outcome and outcome pairings is illustrated in 
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Ambivalent / Trust 
(ambivalent) 
Ambivalent / Distrust 
(ambivalent) 
Distrust / Trust 
(incongruent) 
Distrust / Distrust 
(congruent) 
Figure 1: Experiment 1: Experimental manipulations, showing vignettes consisting of 
pre-outcome and outcome scenarios. 
The congruence or incongruence of the vignettes was manipulated by the pairing 
of the pre-outcome scenarios with these outcome scenarios. For instance, if a pre-
outcome scenario of trust were paired against a distrust outcome scenario, the resulting 
contrast between the antecedents and the outcome would constitute incongruence in the 
vignette. This was anticipated to lead to a heightened level of surprise on the part of the 
participant and therefore may prompt sense-making cognitions. On the other hand, if a 
trust pre-outcome were paired with a trust outcome, the perception of "fit," would 
constitute congruence in the vignette. For such a congruent vignette, very little surprise 
was anticipated, given the pre-outcome that supported trust toward a target that ultimately 
repaid the loan. 
Free recall test. To capture participants' recalled information about the 
vignettes, participants received a single sheet, pencil-and-paper format, open-ended 
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questionnaire with the following instructions: "Write down all the information from last 
week's story that you can remember. Try to remember as much specific information 
about the people, situation and setting as you can. Please write as neatly as possible." 
Trust disposition inventories. The two measurements of traits regarding 
interpersonal trust were administered to the participants by computer program. The 
Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS, Rotter, 1967) is a 40-item questionnaire, with 25-
measurement items and 15-distracter questions in a five-point Likert-scale format. The 
ITS inventory asks for the participants' responses regarding their agreement, to a variety 
of situational statements regarding interpersonal trust (e.g. "Most people can be counted 
on to do what they say they will do."). The ITS gives an index score ranging from 25 
(lowest trust) to 125 (highest), with a midpoint or neutral position of 75 (Rotter, 1991). 
The ITS has had robust use since its inception four decades ago. This questionnaire 
shows strong evidence of construct validity, which includes significant correlations to 
sociometric trust scales, r=.37 (Rotter, 1967). The ITS shows test-retest reliability at 
three-month intervals of .68 (Robinson, Shaver, Wrightsman, & Andrews, 1991). 
The Revised Philosophy of Human Nature Scale (RPHN, Wrightsman, 1991; 
Wrightsman, 1992) is a 20-question Likert scale (six-point) inventory that calculates an 
index using two subscale measurements: ten items measuring participants' agreement 
responses to statements that favor interpersonal trust (e.g. "People usually tell the truth, 
even when they know they would be better off lying.") and ten items measuring 
inclinations toward cynicism or non-trusting attitudes of others (e.g. "Most people would 
tell a lie if they could gain by it."). In both the trust and cynicism subscales, the scales 
will range -30 to 30. The RPHN index scores cynicism negatively and combines both for 
a range of-60 (lowest trust in human nature) to 60, (highest trust), with neutral positions 
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of zero (Wrightsman, 1992). The RPHN also shows a strong history of use since 1974. 
There is evidence of convergent validity with comparable attitude measures such as 
Rosenberg's faith-in-people scale, r=.ll, as well as Christie's Machiavellianism Scale, 
r=-.68, with a test-retest reliability of .90 (Robinson, et al., 1991). 
Design and Procedure 
The design is a 2 (predictive/retrospective judgment) X 3 pre-outcome scenario 
(trust/ambivalent/distrust) X 2 outcome scenario (trust/distrust) split-plot design with 
judgment as a within-subjects variable. Results were measured using a number of 
statistical analyses, including frequencies, descriptive statistics and a split-plot analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), with post-hoc tests, contrasts, planned comparisons and non-
parametric analysis (i.e., Mests) performed as needed. The participants were randomly 
assigned to all conditions. The data from this study consisted of responses to the 
prediction and retrospection queries, which were continuous scales with scores ranging 
from 1 to 80, determined by the marker's position on the answer continuum. For 
hypothesis testing, a statistically significant shift of retrospective judgment responses 
toward the outcome, when compared to predictive judgments at an alpha level of/? <.05, 
constituted statistical significance as a hindsight bias effect. 
One hundred and eighty participants were measured in two sessions, exactly one 
week apart. Participants who volunteered for the pilot study were excluded, as well as 
those who had participated in similar experiments examining hindsight bias. Two 
hundred twenty-one participants originally signed up to participate in this research 
through SONA for participation credit. Over the course of three college semesters, 17 
participants (8%) were dropped because they failed to show up for the second session, 
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data from 20 participants was lost due to data collection errors2 (9%), data from 4 
participants were lost due to a malfunctioning lab computer (2%) and one participant 
(<1%) was dropped as an unreliable respondent due to conflicting demographic 
information that was provided in Sessions 1 and 2. 
LEFT A RROW KEY moves LEFT RIGHT ARROW KEY moves RIGHT 
Mark had to decide whether or not to trust Jim to pay him back... 





Press ENTER to record your 
response 
Figure 2: Experiment 1: Example of screen for Session 1 measure of prediction 
judgment. 
Session 1. Prior to the procedures in the first session, the participants received a 
notification of participants' rights (Appendix I), during an introductory briefing, which 
they signed to indicate their agreement to participate in the study. A brief series of 
introductory and instruction screens were first presented to the participants, as well as 
demographic questions to capture the participants' age, sex and experience with English. 
2 Data collection errors included: Eight participants (4%) who were assigned to wrong 
procedure on computer, eleven (5%) accidentally double-booked computer lab for the 
second session, and researcher accidently gave one participant (<1%) a debriefing instead 
of the informed consent document. 
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They worked through a brief training session to familiarize themselves with the 
procedure. Following the instructions and practice session, the participants read the pre-
outcome scenario in a vignette presented one line at a time on their monitors, as they 
advanced from screen to screen at their own pace. 
Immediately after the pre-outcome scenario, the participants were queried for 
their predictive judgment. This prediction measure consisted of one question, presented 
to the participants on the screen (see Figure 2) to gauge their estimation of the target's 
trustworthiness: "Mark had to decide whether or not to trust Jim to pay him back... Use 
the scale below to indicate your opinion of how trustworthy Jim is." The question 
appeared next to a continuum marked "Definitely not trustworthy" on the left pole, with 
"Definitely trustworthy" on the right and the sliding bar appeared at a random point near 
the center of the band. The participants could move the sliding bar using the arrow keys 
on the computer keyboard to show their opinion of the target's trustworthiness. 
LEFT ARROW KEY moves LEFT RIGHT ARROW KEY moves RIGHT 
How important or relevant is the following sentence to the different 
possible outcomes (Trust or Distrust)? 
On occasion, Mark has known Jim to have lapses in integrity, which 





Press ENTER to record your 
response 
Figure 3: Experiment 1: Example of screen for one of the 
sentence ratings in Session 1. 
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Following the predictive measure, participants then responded to a series of 
inquiries (Figure 3) addressing each sentence of the pre-outcome scenario to determine 
how each sentence influenced perceptions of target trustworthiness for the recall memory 
task. Next, the outcome scenario was presented on the screen. Here the participants 
learned the outcome of the vignette: that, in fact, the target was trusted by his roommate 
and following that, whether or not the target ended up being trustworthy. All the outcome 
scenarios were randomly assigned. Following the outcome information, a final question 
was asked of the participants to measure their subjective feelings of surprise at the 
outcome: "How surprising was it that Jim paid back the loan?" or "How surprising was it 
that Jim didn't pay back the loan?" Again the response was measured by moving a 
sliding bar across a continuum with "Not at all surprising" on the left pole, to "Very 
surprising" on the right, as shown in Figure 4. 
LEFT ARROW KEY moves LEFT RIGHT ARROW KEY moves RIGHT 
Please use the rating scale below to answer the following question.. 
How surprising was it that Jim paid back the loan? 




Press ENTER ro record your 
response 
Figure 4: Experiment 1: Example of screen for Session 1 
manipulation check for degree of surprise. 
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Figure 5: Experiment 1: Example of screens for Session 2 measure of retrospection 
judgment. 
Session 2. During the second session one week later, the participants were again 
seated at a computer terminal, which simply re-presented the questions from the first 
session. For the retrospection measure on the money loan scenario, they were asked the 
following: "Try to remember your response from last week... Mark had to decide 
whether or not to trust Jim to pay him back... Use the scale below to indicate your 
opinion of how trustworthy Jim is." As before, the question appeared just above a 
continuum that was marked "Definitely not trustworthy" on the left pole and "Definitely 
trustworthy" on the right. Participants responded by moving a sliding bar from the center 
to mark their recollection of their original opinion of the target's trustworthiness, 
depicted in Figure 5. 
Immediately following the retrospection measure, the free recall test was 
administered. Participants were instructed to turn over a form, which was placed next to 
their PC and write down all that they could remember from the original vignette onto the 
form. 
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After the free recall task, the Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS, Appendix J) and the 
Revised Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (RPHN, Appendix K) were administered 
by computer inventory (see Figure 6) to measure participants' generalized and 
dispositional expectancies of trust. These were placed at the very end of the trial, rather 
than before the experiment's primary manipulations and observations, as to not introduce 
priming effects on our variables of interest, resulting from numerous questions 
concerning trust. 
Please carefully read and use your mouse to respond the following 
question, by clicking the response you agree with the most.. 








Agree I Agree 




CLICK on a response above to advance to the next question 
Figure 6: Example of a screen for Session 2, an item in an 
Interpersonal Trust Measure (Revised Philosophies of 
Human Nature Scale), used in both Experiments 1 and 2. 
Lastly, after the trust measures, participants were fully debriefed, offered an 
opportunity to respond and ask questions of the experimenter, thanked for their 
participation and then excused. 
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Results 
Prediction ratings. To determine whether the pre-outcome scenarios influenced 
the participants' evaluations of target trustworthiness as intended, the prediction ratings 
of target trustworthiness prior to learning the outcome were evaluated as a manipulation 
check. After dropping one participant as an outlier due to very low responses for 
prediction judgments (z-score > -3), as suggested by Tabachnick & Fidell (2001), one 
sample Mests were performed to determine whether estimates of target trustworthiness 
differed from the midpoint of the scale. Participants who were exposed to the ambivalent 
conditions (M=.23, SZ)=15.02) did not differ significantly from a zero rating, t (59)= -.11, 
n.s, Cohen's d= -0.02. In the trust pre-outcome (M=19.93, SD=14.S5), t (59)= 10.40, 
/K.001, 6?=1.28, participant responses were statistically significant in their trending away 
from zero. By comparison, among those who were exposed to the distrust pre-outcome, 
participants' estimations (centered at midpoint) of the target's trustworthiness for (Af=-
7.73, £D=13.78) also differed significantly from zero, t (59)= -4.35,p<.001, d= -0.74. 
When the effect sizes of the trust and distrust conditions were compared, the trust pre-
outcome scenarios lead to a 1.73 times greater effect on predictive judgments than did the 
distrust pre-outcome. This would suggest that the distrust pre-outcome might have been 
less effective at biasing participants toward the intended outcome. 
Surprise ratings. Surprise ratings were used to provide a second check of the 
validity of the pre-outcome manipulation. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was 
used to evaluate responses of the participant's surprise across levels of congruency 
(incongruent/ambivalent/congruent) as a second set of manipulation checks. If the 
manipulation was effective, then the participants receiving outcomes that are incongruent 
with the pre-outcome scenario should show higher surprise ratings. Likewise, those 
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receiving outcomes that are congruent with the pre-outcome scenario should show lower 
surprise ratings. Either outcome when combined with the ambivalent pre-outcome 
scenario should show a central tendency and serve as the baseline condition by which 
surprise or expectation can be assessed. In other words, in a successful manipulation, the 
averaged ratings of surprise should fall in the following sequence: congruent < 
ambivalent < incongruent. 
Experiment 1: Means for Surprise 

























Note: Error bars = Standard Error 
Figure 7: Experiment 1: Mean and standard errors of Surprise ratings as a function of 
pre-outcome and outcome conditions. 
Results confirmed that the combinations of pre-outcome and outcome scenarios in 
the vignettes were successful in manipulating participants' feelings of surprise at the 
outcome, F(2, 176) = 32.96,/? < 0.001, rf = 0.28, with responses indicating that the 
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incongruent vignettes succeeded in bringing about higher surprise ratings. Planned 
comparisons (see Figure 7), showed that participants' surprise ratings were highest in the 
incongruent conditions (M=52.59, SD=20.67), such as when a trust pre-outcome was 
paired with a distrust outcome, or a distrust pre-outcome scenario was followed by a trust 
outcome. Those in the ambivalent conditions (M=35.27, SD=22.4S), where the pre-
outcome statements supporting trust and distrust were equated and there was either a trust 
or distrust outcome, had reported moderate feelings of surprise and significantly lower 
than those in incongruent conditions, F(\, 176) = 19.14,/> < 0.001, rf = 0.10. The 
congruent conditions (M=20.59, £0=21.29) - such as a trust pre-outcome followed by a 
trust outcome, or distrust pre-outcome paired with a distrust outcome - reported the 
lowest levels of surprise, displaying significantly lower surprise than in the ambivalent 
conditions, F(l, 176) = 14.10,p < 0.001, rf = 0.07. 
Hindsight Bias. The presence of hindsight bias among the participant's pre-test 
and post-test responses was evaluated via a 2 (predictive/retrospective judgment) 3 pre-
outcome scenario (trust/ambivalent/distrust) X 2 outcome scenario (trust/distrust) split-
plot design ANOVA. Evidence of the hindsight bias was observed when examining 
judgments of trust, F (1, 174) = 6.15,/? < 0.05, rf = 0.03, as hypothesized (Hi). A 
significant interaction was found across conditions of prediction/retrospection judgments, 
pre-outcome and outcome scenarios, F (2, 174) = 38.19,/? < 0.001, rf = 0.31, (see Figure 
8). Among the vignettes that had ambivalent pre-outcome scenarios, a very slight 
hindsight pattern was observed following a trust outcome scenario, /(29) = -1.78, ns, 
Cohen's d = .24. Also, no effect was observed for vignettes with an ambivalent pre-
outcome scenario, followed by a distrust outcome, /(29) = -.49, ns., d= .08. 
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Note: Error bars = Confidence interval 
Figure 8: Experiment 1: Means and confidence intervals for prediction and 
retrospection ratings measures as a function of pre-outcome and outcome 
conditions. 
In vignettes with trust pre-outcome scenarios paired with trust outcomes, a 
congruent condition, participants' retrospection scores fell from their original trust 
evaluations, in essence showing a significant reverse hindsight bias effect, t (30) = 3.64, 
p < .01, d = -.51. The largest hindsight bias effect of all the results was observed in the 
vignette when a trust pre-outcome was followed by a distrust outcome, an incongruent 
condition, t (28) = -4.49,/? < .001, d= 1.14. In the vignette with a distrust pre-outcome 
and a trust outcome, an incongruent condition, no effect was observed, t(29) = -.41, ns, d 
= .07, which was contrary to our prediction. Lastly, no effect was seen for the distrust 
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pre-outcome with a distrust outcome, a congruent condition, t(29) = .06, ns, d=.01. This 
failed to show the reverse hindsight bias effect, which was observed in the previously 
mentioned congruent condition with the trust pre-outcome scenario and the trust 
outcome. The prediction (H2) that hindsight bias effects would be observed in the 
incongruent and ambivalent conditions, but not the congruent condition, was partially 
supported, as a statistically significant hindsight bias effect was observed in only one 
incongruent condition. 
Free recall. A free recall memory task was administered to look for patterns or 
distortions in the participants' memories of pre-outcome information and if these might 
play a role in producing the hindsight bias effect. Specifically, we were interested to 
know whether participants who showed hindsight bias effects would recall 
disproportionately more outcome-supporting information than the proportion that they 
received in the vignettes. For the free recall analysis, a series of one-way ANOVAs were 
employed to measure mean differences of recalled information in each condition. Also, 
using one sample Mests, the proportion of outcome-supporting information that 
participants recalled from the vignettes was compared to the proportion that was 
presented in the vignettes to examine for the predicted (H3) greater recall of outcome-
supporting information that were concurrent with observations of hindsight bias. 
For the purposes of coding the content of the free recall tasks, the text for the 
ambivalent version of the money loan vignette was deconstructed into distinct and 
separate pieces of information or information blocks, (e.g. "Mark has known Jim to be 
mostly reliable," and "Jim has lied to girlfriends"). This itemized list of the story's 
content was sorted into three categories. The first category contained situational or 
neutral pieces of information, with 11 pieces of information from the 9 sentences 
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describing the situation. The second was trust-supporting information, with 19 items from 
the 9 sentences that supported trust. The third was distrust-supporting information, with 
17 items from the other 9 sentences. The resulting 47 items of information were produced 
on a rubric for coding. Two research assistants matched content of the written free recall 
surveys with the itemized list of information blocks on the rubric, to determine which of 
the items were remembered from the original story. Inter-rater reliability showed to be 
ample, with Cronbach's alphas of .92 for situational or outcome-neutral coding, .95 for 
items supporting trust and .96 for items supporting distrust. Scores were averaged 
between the two sets of data from the coders in order to generate a single dependent 
variable indicating the amount of information recalled from the story that supported trust, 
distrust or was outcome-neutral. 
The means for the amount of recalled items, shown on Table 1, were examined 
through a 3 (pre-outcome scenario: trust/ambivalent /distrust) X 2 (outcomes: 
trust/distrust) factorial between subjects analysis of variance. For these exploratory 
analyses, ten participants were excluded from this analysis because their data were not 
analyzable: two had failed to report any outcome-supporting or non-supporting 
information and eight participants left their recall task sheets blank. In the analysis, no 
significant differences were detected between groups when examining participants' 
memories for situational or neutral story information, F(2, 164) =1.49, ns, nor from 
memories of trust-supporting items F(2,164) = 2.97, ns, as well as distrust-supporting 
items F(2, 164) = .97, ns. It should be noted that, having struck five sentences from the 
congruent and incongruent conditions, these groups received approximately 30% less 
information than did the ambivalent group. Therefore, it is noteworthy that there were not 
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significant differences between groups for information that was remembered during the 
free recall task. 
Table 1: 
Experiment I: Means and Standard Deviations for Recalled Information in Free Recall 
tasks, as a Function ofPre-outcome, Outcome Scenarios and Type of Information. 
Situation Supporting Trust-supporting Distrust-supporting 
Variables 
M SD M SD M SD 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Trust" 2.98 1.51 3.55 1.52 1.96 1.15 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Distrust * 2.72 1.56 2.59 1.19 2.69 1.77 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 
Outcome: Trustc 2.73 1.61 3.70 1.77 1.54 1.39 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 
Outcome: Distrustc 3.25 1.24 3.68 1.91 2.98 1.79 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 
Outcome: Trust * 3.12 1.12 5.09 2.33 .70 .86 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 
Outcome: Distrusta 2.85 1.16 3.46 1.62 1.88 1.14 
° = Incongruent, * = Congruent,c = Ambivalent 
Next, the proportions of outcome-supporting information that the participants 
recalled from their vignettes (see Table 2) were compared against the proportions of 
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outcome-supporting information that was presented to them in the various conditions 
(Table 3). 
Table 2: 
Experiment 1: Means for Outcome Supporting and Non-Outcome-Supporting Recalled 
Information with Comparison Ratios, as a Function of Pre-outcome and Outcome 
Scenarios. 
Variables 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Trust" 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Distrust * 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 
Outcome: Trustc 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 
Outcome: Distrustc 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 
Outcome: Trust * 




































































a = Incongruent, b = Congruent,c = Ambivalent, d Comparison ratio = Outcome-supporting 
recalled /Total of outcome-supporting and outcome-non-supporting information recalled 
36 
Table 3: 
Experiment 1: Means for Outcome Supporting and Non-Outcome-Supporting 
Information Presented in the Vignettes with Comparison Ratios, as a Function ofPre-
outcome and Outcome Scenarios. 
Variables 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Trust" 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Distrust * 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 
Outcome: Trustc 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 
Outcome: Distruste 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 
Outcome: Trust * 







































" = Incongruent, b = Congruent,c = Ambivalent, Comparison ratio = Outcome-supporting 
recalled /Total of outcome-supporting and outcome-non-supporting information recalled 
These comparison ratios would be examined by /-tests, to make determinations as 
to whether participants showing hindsight effects retained proportionately more or less 
outcome-supporting information than what was given to them. Comparison ratios were 
established for recalled information by dividing the amount of outcome-supporting items 
that was recalled, by the sum of the outcome-supporting and the non-outcome-supporting 
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information that was recalled by the participants. These ratios were measured against 
corresponding comparison ratios for presentations, which were simply the total outcome-
supporting information presented, divided by the sum of the outcome-supporting and 
non-outcome-supporting information that was presented. 
Table 4: 
Experiment 1: Means, T-tests and Effect Sizes for Free Recall Tasks and Comparisons 
Variables N Comparison Comparison td Cohen's 
Ratio: Ratio: <f 
Recalled Presented 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 28 0.66 0.19 13.37*** 1.74 
Outcome: Trust" 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 29 0.49 0.81 8.32*** -1.48 
Outcome: Distrust * 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 28 0.74 0.53 5.50*** 1.19 
Outcome: Trustc 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 28 0.45 0.47 -0.48 -0.13 
Outcome: Distrustc 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 29 0.88 0.83 1.60 0.42 
Outcome: Trust * 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 28 0.34 0.17 4.72*** 1.09 
Outcome: Distrust" 
" = Incongruent, b = Congruent,c = Ambivalent, d one sample, *** =p<.00l (2 tailed),e 
Cohen's d> 0 indicates higher proportion of recalled information than presented. 
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One-sample Mests were used to examine whether the proportion of recalled 
outcome-supporting items differed significantly from that which was in the presented 
information (shown on Table 4). These comparisons showed that in both incongruent 
conditions, where pre-outcome scenario suggested a different outcome than what 
happened, participants recalled a significantly higher amount of outcome-supporting 
information. A similar pattern in one ambivalent condition was observed, where the 
target behaved trustworthy in the outcome. In one congruent condition, where the pre-
outcome scenario suggested a non-trustworthy target that ultimately defected, participants 
recalled a significantly lower proportion of outcome supporting information than was 
presented to them. No significant differences were observed in any other conditions, 
including the congruent condition where the pre-outcome scenario depicted a trustworthy 
target that behaved trustworthy in the outcome. 
Trust inventories. To examine whether individual differences in generalized 
trust expectancies influenced hindsight bias responses, various analyses were used. In 
addition to checks for reliability, a correlation analysis was used to explore for possible 
relationships between key measures such as participants' feelings of surprise at the 
outcome, as well as hindsight bias measurements. 
An examination of both trust inventories indicated that reliability was within the 
margins of acceptability for both the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Cronbach's a = .71) and 
the Revised Philosophy of Human Nature (RPHN) Inventory (a = .64), as well as the 
RPHN subscales for both Trust (a = .76) and Cynicism (a = .67). These indicators for 
generalized interpersonal trust, viewable on Table 5, were strongly correlated with one 
another, as expected, r (179) =.45,/?<.001. 
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Table 5: 
Experiment 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Skew and Kurtosis for the Measures of 
Generalized Trust expectancies. 
Variable Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Interpersonal Trust 60.50 7.73 -.37 .36 
Scale (ITS) 








Revised Philosophy of -7.01 12.09 -.06 .41 
Human Nature 
Inventory (PHN) 
The participants' responses to these inventories were examined to insure that 
responses were not affected by the experimental manipulation. A factorial 3 (pre-outcome 
scenarios: trust/ambivalent/distrust) X 2 (outcome scenarios: trust/ distrust) ANOVA 
served as a test for independence for the ITS and the RPHN, revealing no main effects or 
interactions, indicating minimal effects on the responses from the exposure to the 
vignettes and questions, all F's < 2 (Tables 6 and 7). 
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Table 6: 
Experiment 1: Analysis of Variance Source Table for ITS measures. 
Source df F partial rf p 
Pre-Outcome 2 .68 .01 .51 
Outcome 1 1.52 .01 .22 
Pre-Outcome * Outcome 1 .36 .00 .70 
Error 174 
Table 7: 
Experiment 1: Analysis of Variance Source Table for RPHN measures. 
Source df F partial rf p 
Pre-Outcome 2 .39 .01 .68 
Outcome 1 .40 .00 .53 
Pre-Outcome * Outcome 1 2.01 .02 .14 
Error 174 
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An important question in this research was whether predispositions toward trust 
behaviors might influence patterns of trust-related hindsight bias effects. Therefore, an 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was constructed to examine the dependent variable of 
hindsight bias effects, which was calculated using the mean differences between 
participant's prediction and retrospection scores and adjusted for directionality (i.e., 
scores in the distrust outcome condition were multiplied by -1). The ANCOVA entered 
in the interaction terms of the experimental variables to determine if the magnitude of 
participants' hindsight bias effects were moderated by generalized trust dispositions. 
The ANCOVA with ITS as the covariate showed no relationship between ITS 
scores and hindsight bias effects and no interactions between ITS and any of the 
experimental variables. Likewise, the RPHN indicated no relationship with hindsight bias 
effects or interactions with the experimental variables, all F's <1 (see Tables 8 and 9). 
Table 8: 
Experiment 1: Analysis of Covariance for Hindsight Bias Effects with ITS as a Covariate. 
Source df partial rf 
ITS (cv) 
Pre-Outcome * ITS score 
Outcome * ITSscore 
















Experiment 1: Analysis of Covariance for Hindsight Bias Effects with RPHN as a 
Covariate. 
Source df partial rf 
RPHN (cv) 
Pre-Outcome * RPHN 
Outcome * RPHN 















A similar ANCOVA for surprise-ratings (see Table 10) revealed a significant 
two-way interaction between the ITS and surprise for conditions of outcome, F(l,167)= 
3.17,/?<.05. The ANCOVA examining surprise-ratings as adjusted by the RPHN (Table 
11) did reveal a significant three-way interaction of between pre-outcome and outcome 
conditions as moderated by RPHN, F(2,167)= 3.07,/K.05. Results were mostly 
uncorrelated between the ITS and RPHN when compared against the measures for 
surprise and participant's hindsight bias responses (see Tables 12 and 13). The single 
exception was a significant negative correlation between the RPHN measure and surprise 
for the trust pre-outcome scenario with the trust outcome, r (29) = -A0,p<.05. 
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Table 10: 
Analysis of Covariance for surprise with ITS as a Covariate in Experiment 1 
Source df partial rf 
ITS (cv) 
Pre-Outcome * ITSscore 
Outcome * ITSscore 
















Analysis of Covariance for surprise with RPHN as a Covariate in Experiment 1 
Source df partial rf 
RPHN (cv) 
Pre-Outcome * RPHN 
Outcome * RPHN 

















Correlations comparing the ITS against Surprise and Hindsight Effects in Experiment 1 
(Money Loan Story) 
Pre-outcome story: Pre-outcome story: Pre-outcome story: 
Distrust Ambivalent Trust 
Outcome Surprise HSB Surprise HSB Surprise HSB 
r(p) r(p) r(p) r (p) r (p) r (p) 
Trustworthy .23 (.24) -.01 (.98) -.34 (.07) .05 (.80) .01 (.96) -.25 (.18) 
Defection -.06 (.77) -.09 (.65) -.19 (.44) -.08 (.68) .34 (.07) -.12 (.54) 
Table 13: 
Correlations comparing the RPHN against Surprise and Hindsight Effects in Experiment 
I (Money Loan Story) 
Pre-outcome story: Pre-outcome story: Pre-outcome story: 
Distrust Ambivalent Trust 
Outcome Surprise HSB Surprise HSB Surprise HSB 
r(p) r(p) r(p) r (p) r (p) r (p) 
Trustworthy .32 (.09) -.03 (.88) -.29 (.12) .01 (.95) -.40*(.03) -.26(.16) 




Experiment 1 supported our first hypothesis that judgments of trust are 
susceptible to hindsight bias effects, much the same as are other judgments under 
uncertainty. Hindsight bias was observed on ratings of trustworthiness on the average, 
across all conditions. 
Our second hypothesis was partially supported, as a very large effect was 
observed in one of the predicted conditions: the incongruent condition where the pre-
outcome scenario supported trust in the target, who defected in the outcome. Previous 
research has shown that negative outcomes can yield larger hindsight bias effects when 
compared to positive outcomes (Guilbault, et al., 2004). Because a trust betrayal is a 
serious norm violation (Barber, 1983; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998) and is 
generally considered a very negative outcome, it may receive hardy and well-motivated 
processing during sense-making cognitions (Baumeister, et al, 2001). Also, outcomes 
that are considered to be task failures, i.e., the failure to repay the obligation of a loan, are 
theorized to motivate the cognitive explanation processes that implicated in sense-making 
(Anderson, et al., 1996; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007). 
A betrayal outcome in a vignette could also activate a sense of personal relevance 
on the part of the participant, if they have had prior experience, are familiar, or can 
identify with being betrayed. This could invite emotional arousal and lead to robust 
cognitive activity during sense-making, which could manifest in an increased effect size 
within the assumptions of the sense-making model and in turn bring about the strong 
effect shown among these participants. Personal relevance has been theorized to lead to 
increased effect sizes in hindsight research; however a recent meta-analysis observed 
46 
mixed results for this factor, perhaps because of too few studies being available and 
subsequent lack of statistical power (Guilbault, et al., 2004). In this experiment, no 
questions were asked of the participants about whether or not they had personal or prior 
experience of a similar betrayal as depicted in the vignette. This dimension remains an 
interesting opportunity for further examination. Subsequent research into hindsight bias 
during trust decisions may do well to include history questions addressing personal 
relevance to explore it as an independent variable. 
In the incongruent condition with the distrust pre-outcome followed by the trust 
outcome, results showed no evidence of hindsight bias effects. This pattern was not 
predicted in our hypothesis (H2) and is a departure from previous research (Ash, 2009) 
where hindsight patterns were witnessed during incongruent outcome conditions. One 
possible explanation for the failure to find hindsight bias effects in this incongruent 
condition may be that the distrust pre-outcome scenario did not sufficiently bias the 
participants toward the intended outcome. Recall that the distrust pre-outcome scenario 
had a much smaller effect on predictive ratings when compared to the trust pre-outcome. 
Furthermore, the difference between the surprise ratings for incongruent and congruent 
outcomes was smaller for the distrust pre-outcome than for the trust pre-outcome. 
A possible explanation for the lack of biasing may be insufficient motivation 
among the participants for sense-making cognitions, which were needed for participants 
to seek to explain the story (Anderson, et al., 1996), despite the fact they did rate the 
outcome as surprising. Anderson et al. (1996) observed that cognitive explanation 
processes are more associated with a task failure than not, which may explain the higher 
bias observed in the incongruent condition where the target defaulted as compared with 
this condition where the target repaid the debt. 
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Also, there are strong social and normative contexts regarding the sustainment of 
trust (Barber, 1983; Lewicki, et al., 1998) - not the least of which is that trustworthy 
behavior is a foundational and general expectation on the part of society. In this context, 
a distrust pre-outcome scenario paired with a trust outcome, despite being surprising, may 
not invite sense-making in that such an outcome may seem expected and proper in 
hindsight in light of the social mandate toward trustworthy conduct, as the loan 
repayment would be modeled in the cognitions of the participants as more proper and 
right-minded behavior. 
Previous hindsight bias research has indicated that surprise does not appear solely 
to drive hindsight bias, as surprise responses and hindsight bias effects show little 
correlation (Ash, 2009). In that light, this instance supports the view that more is required 
to initiate sense-making than just surprise alone. Perhaps very little (if any) sense-making 
may have been required to explain repaying an informal loan for a trivial amount of 
money. To that extent, such an outcome may have been perceived as a "non-event." It 
may not require more of an explanation past the fact that trust was upheld and the small 
loan was repaid and therefore show a constrained effect. Hindsight bias research has 
indicated that recollections of non-events often show reduced hindsight bias effects 
(Guilbault, et al., 2004; Wasserman, Lempert, & Hastie, 1991). Follow-ups and 
replications of this experimental design may do well to pay more attention the degree of 
biasing in the manipulations and produce pre-outcome scenarios with content that 
sufficiently invites or motivates sense-making. 
A fascinating result was the "reversed hindsight bias" effect found in the 
congruent condition that supported trust in the pre-outcome scenario and had a 
trustworthy outcome. The hypothesized sense-making theories, which predicted no 
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effects in this condition, failed to predict or explain these results. We will return to briefly 
deliberate this effect in the general discussion section of this paper. 
The free recall measures showed memory biases among participants in the 
incongruent conditions, where those exposed to stories leading to unexpected or 
surprising outcomes recalled a higher proportion of outcome-supporting information than 
was actually presented in the vignettes. In addition to the incongruent conditions, there 
was a similar pattern in the equated condition where the target acted trustworthy, showing 
a significantly elevated ratio of recalled information. In all three of these conditions only 
one, the trust-favoring congruent condition, also showed a significant hindsight bias 
effect. Our hypothesis was partially supported in that the elevated recall comparison 
ratios were observed on both incongruent conditions and one ambivalent condition. These 
did not match the pattern of hindsight biases as predicted as only one of the incongruent 
conditions showed the hindsight bias effect. This exploration measure only is designed to 
analyze trends in the recall of presented vignette information, and not necessarily to 
capture all cognitions from a judgment or recollection. As such, the free recall task, while 
showing predicted trends in the recall proportions of outcome-supporting information 
from an incongruent condition, may be unequipped to make complete determinations 
about whether or not successful sense-making occurred. When taking into account the 
insufficient biasing in this condition that mentioned earlier, this elevated trend in the free 
recall task and the lack of hindsight bias may not be self-contradictory, if motivated and 
successful sense-making did not happen. In this context, it could possibly act as a "false-
positive." 
Finally, the exploratory analysis for generalized trust measures revealed no 
relationship between these traits and our variables of interest. In one inventory, the 
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RPHN, there was a single significant negative correlation between that trust inventory 
and the surprise measure, in the congruent condition favoring trust in the target. It seems 
intuitively reasonable to expect that a generally trusting participant would not feel 
surprise that a trustworthy target would uphold trust. That the correlation would occur 
here and in a condition that only saw modest reports of surprise, suggests this not to be a 
meaningful result. 
It is noteworthy that the measures for both inventories are designed to access 
metacognitive attitudes of high personal relevance, which were socially learned, to obtain 
a measure on an individual's attitudes regarding trust (Rotter, 1971; Wrightsman, 1992). 
The third-person vignettes trust depicted in the experiment may well be modeled quite 
differently in the minds of the participants than more personally relevant or first person 
judgments of trust. The overall lack of a relationship between the trust inventories and the 
hindsight bias responses - or even the surprise measures - suggests that these generalized 
trust expectancies do not tap into the operational mechanisms that affect the types of 
judgments as were measured here and may well be an incorrect instrument for measuring 
individual differences in cognitions in the context of third-person trust observations. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
The goal of this experiment was to continue an examination as to whether trust 
judgments are susceptible to hindsight bias effects, as are other judgments under 
uncertainty. Experiment 2 replicated the previous experiment with improvements in the 
manipulation, including a better-balanced presentation of the pre-outcome scenarios that 
were corrected for insufficient biasing in the distrust condition that was seen in 
Experiment 1. Participants were exposed to a new set of vignettes of an interpersonal 
trust decision depicting a decision of a small business owner as he deliberated the hiring 
of a friend. As before, individual differences regarding trust were also examined to 
investigate how they might moderate hindsight bias effects. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty-three participants were recruited from the volunteer 
participant pool of students at Old Dominion University. As before, mostly young adults 
were in this convenience sample, with 172 (94%) of the volunteers were between the 
ages of 18 and 24 and 11 (6%) were between 26 and 42 years of age. The volunteers were 
mostly female, with 131 women (71.6%) and 52 men (28.4%) participating in the trials. 
Nearly all participants showed a mastery of English: with 171 (93.4%) reporting that 
English was their primary language; five (2.7%) reported that English has been their 
primary language for more than a decade; one (<1%) stating that English has been the 
primary language for less than five years and three participants (1.6%) indicating that 
English is not their primary language. 
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Apparatus 
All materials and procedures in Experiment 2 remained identical to those used in 
Experiment 1, with the exception of the pre-outcome and outcome scenarios in the 
vignettes, as well as the survey questions about those vignettes. For this experiment, 
Story 2 from the pilot study, the vignette depicting the quandary of a small business 
owner in hiring a friend (see Appendix L) was used in place of Story 1. 
Design and Procedure 
The measures and analyses were designed the same way as in Experiment 1: a 
split-plot design 2 (predictive / retrospective judgment) X 3 pre-outcome scenario 
(trust/ambivalent /distrust) X 2 outcome scenario (trust/distrust) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with post-hoc tests, contrasts, planned comparisons and non-parametric 
analysis as necessary. 
LEFT ARROW KEY moves LEFT RIGHT ARROW KEY moves RIGHT 
John bad to decide whether or not to trust Chip to work for him at his 
small business... 
Use the scale below to indicate your opinion of how trustworthy Chip 
is. 




Press ENTER to record your 
response 
Figure 9: Experiment 2: Example of screen for the Session 
1 measure of prediction judgment. 
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As before, the volunteers were measured in two sessions, exactly one week apart. 
Participants were recruited using the same the SONA research participation system and 
recruitment fliers as in Experiment 1. A total of 255 participants signed up during the run 
of the project, which was three semesters in duration. Thirty-six participants (14%) were 
dropped because they did not show for the second session, 26 (10%) were dropped due to 
data collection errors3, 8 participants (3%) lost their data due to a malfunctioning lab 
computer and one participant (<1%) was dropped as an unreliable respondent due to 
conflicting demographic information provided in Sessions 1 and 2. Participants who 
volunteered for the pilot study, Experiment 1, or any similar experiment studying 
hindsight bias effects were excluded. This left 183 participants, who received two 
research credits, one for each appointment/hour, as compensation for their participation 
in both sessions. 
John bad to decide whether or not to trust Chip to run his business... 





Press ENTER to record your response 
• Definitely 
• Trustworthy 
Figure 10: Experiment 2: Example of screens for Session 2 measure of retrospection 
judgment. 
3 Types of data collection errors include: 12 participants (5%) were assigned to wrong 
procedure on computer during second session and 14 participants (5%) were accidentally 
double-booked computer lab for the second session. 
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The prediction inquiry will be "John had to decide whether or not to trust Chip to 
run his small business... Use the scale below to indicate your opinion of how trustworthy 
Chip is," (Figure 9). The surprise manipulation check posed: "How surprising was it that 
Chip turned out to be a good employee?" if the target proved trustworthy in the outcome, 
or, if he defected, "How surprising was it that Chip turned out to be a bad employee?" 
One week later in Session 2, the retrospection question (Figure 10) asked: "Try to 
remember your response from last week... John had to decide whether or not to trust 
Chip to work for him at his small business... Use the scale below to indicate your opinion 
of how trustworthy Chip is." 
Again, as in Experiment 1, exploratory tests (trust inventories and the free recall 
task) were administered before debriefing and excusing the participants in session 2. 
Results 
Prediction ratings. As in Experiment 1, predictive ratings were analyzed to 
assess whether the manipulations to the pre-outcome scenarios had their intended effects 
on participants expectations. Indeed, these conditions in this experiment showed more 
balanced effects than in Experiment 1. Participants exposed to the trust pre-outcome, 
(M=10.57, 5D=15.14), predicted a trustworthy target, t (60) = 5.46,/K.001, Cohen's d = 
0.89 and differed significantly from zero, as did those exposed to the distrust pre-
outcome scenario (M—14.59, SD=\2.29), who predicted a strongly non-trustworthy 
target, t (60) = -9.28,/K.001, d = -1.29. However, a deviation in effect size was observed 
in the ambivalent condition, where participants prediction ratings (A^-8.95, SD=14.88) 
were significantly less trusting of the target compared to the midpoint, t (60) = -4.70, 
/K.001, d= -0.79 and showed a similar direction of the bias with the distrust pre-outcome 
scenarios. While the sizable effect showing bias toward distrust in the ambivalent 
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condition is a noteworthy issue, the analysis indicated an improved balance in the effects 
of our variables of interest compared to Experiment 1, closing the gap to a 45% 
difference in Cohen's d effect sizes between the biases in the distrust and trust pre-
outcome. 
























Note: Error bars = Standard Error 
Figure 11: Experiment 2: Mean and standard errors of Surprise ratings as a function of 
pre-outcome and outcome conditions. 
Surprise ratings. To evaluate responses of the participant's surprise across 
levels of congruency, the surprise ratings across the levels of pre-outcome and outcome 
scenarios were again made through use of a one-way between-subjects ANOVA. Results 
confirmed that the pre-outcome and outcome combinations showed success in 
manipulating the surprise ratings across levels of congruency (i.e. congruent < 
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ambivalent < incongruent), F(2, 177) = 33.09,/? < 0.001, rf = 0.27, as shown in Figure 
11. The congruent conditions, where pre-outcome scenario led to expected outcomes, 
indicated significantly less surprise than the ambivalent conditions, F(l, 177) = 12.94,/? 
< 0.001, rf = 0.07, as well as incongruent conditions, F(l, 177) = 61. 56, p < 0.001, rf = 
0.26. 


























Note: Error bars = Confidence interval 
Figure 12: Experiment 2: Means and confidence intervals for prediction and 
retrospection ratings measures as a function of pre-outcome and outcome conditions. 
Though participants' surprise was generally higher in the incongruent conditions 
and lower in congruent conditions, planned comparisons indicated mixed results among 
the levels of surprise in each outcome condition and especially so in the ambivalent 
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conditions. Among the surprise ratings of the vignettes with the trust-supporting pre-
outcome scenarios, as seen in Figure 12, there was a significant (and expected) difference 
between the vignettes, where the distrust outcome scenario showed higher surprise than 
the trust outcome, F(l, 111) = 6.38,/? < 0.05, rf = 0.04. For the distrust pre-outcome 
scenarios, a strong difference was also observed between the vignette with the trust 
outcome, which showed significantly higher surprise than the vignette with the distrust 
outcome, F(l, 111) = 73.46,/? < 0.001, rf = 0.29. In the ambivalent vignettes, a similar 
and interesting pattern was observed: the vignette with the distrust outcome also showed 
significantly less surprise than the vignette with the trust outcome, F(l, 177) = 31.94,/? < 
0.001, rf = 0.15. When comparing the vignettes of the ambivalent pre-outcome scenarios 
to the distrust pre-outcomes, less surprise was observed in the ambivalent vignette with a 
trust outcome, F(l, 177) = 1.51,p < 0.01, rf = 0.04., yet there were virtually no 
differences in surprise reactions to vignettes with the distrust outcome, F(l, 111) =.04, 
n.s. This would suggest only moderate differences between the trust pre-outcome 
scenarios and those pre-outcome scenarios that were intended to be ambivalent. 
Hindsight Bias. To investigate the effects of pre-outcome scenario and outcome 
congruence on hindsight bias effects, a 2 (judgment: prediction/retrospection) X 3 (pre-
outcome: trust/ambivalent/distrust) X 2 (outcome: trust/distrust) split-plot ANOVA was 
computed. Results revealed a significant main effect of judgments overall, F(l,177) = 
15.24,/? < .001, partial rf = .08. When collapsing across experimental conditions, the 
mean retrospective judgments (Af=4A7, SD= 15.91) were more in favor of the given 
outcome than were the mean predictive judgments (M= .16, SD=l 8.27). This finding is 
consistent with our predictions (Hi) and replicates the pattern from Experiment 1. 
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There was also a significant three-way interaction, F(2,177) = 39.51,/? < .001, 
partial rj2 - .31. To investigate the nature of this interaction, a series of planned 
comparisons were conducted to assess the significance and direction of hindsight effects 
in each condition. 
In the vignettes with a trust pre-outcome scenario that was paired with the distrust 
outcome, an incongruent condition, a strong hindsight bias effect was observed, /(30)=-
4.20,/><.05, d= .89. A pattern of "reverse hindsight bias" was observed again in the 
vignette with a trust pre-outcome and a trust outcome, a congruent condition, f(29) = 2.38, 
p < .05, d- -.39, where retrospective evaluations the target's trustworthiness fell from 
what was originally cited in predictions. This replicated the reverse hindsight pattern 
found in Experiment 1. In the vignettes with a pre-outcome scenario of distrust, 
significant hindsight bias effects were observed for the trust outcome scenario, *(30) = -
3.25,p < .01, d= .62 and not observed for the distrust outcome, t(29) =.68, n.s.,d= .13. 
Similar patterns were observed among the vignettes that had ambivalent pre-outcome 
scenarios: a significant hindsight bias effect was observed in one of the ambivalent 
conditions with the trust outcome, t(3l)= -2.71,/»<.05, d= .43. This effect is consistent 
with the previous observations from the predictive judgments. No hindsight bias was 
observed with the ambivalent pre-outcome and distrust outcome scenarios, f(28)=-1.80, 
n.s. d= .37. Given our assumptions about sense-making and hindsight biases, this 
repeated pattern may not seem surprising, as similar patterns in predictive judgments 
were seen between in the ambivalent vignettes and those that had pre-outcome scenarios 
depicting a non-trustworthy target. Because the pre-outcome scenario led to a bias toward 
distrust among the participants, these conditions should be viewed as incongruent rather 
than ambivalent conditions. As such, these results confirmed our predictions of 
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interactions of hindsight bias in judgments of trust, which were influenced by outcome 
congruency (H2). 
Free recall. Just as in Experiment 1, the story's content was broken down and 
sorted into neutral, trust-supporting and distrust-supporting information blocks. There 
were 28 pieces of information pulled from the 11 sentences that were neutral in 
describing the situation. Despite the equal number of sentences in the vignette between 
the trust-supporting and distrust-supporting sets, the deconstruction of these sentences 
into separate pieces of information showed a strong asymmetry between the two sets, due 
to differences in the content and sentence construction between the trust and distrust-
supporting sentences. From the nine trust-supporting sentences, 28 pieces of information 
were found; and from the other nine sentences that depicted the target as non-trustworthy, 
45 separate pieces of information were tallied. This was due to a prevalence of distrust-
supporting sentences that were compound sentences holding multiple pieces of 
information (e.g.: "John knows Chip is a guy who 'has some problems' and has struggled 
with alcohol and cocaine use over the years, which has cost him some friends over 
time"). This contributed to considerably fewer trust-supporting pieces of information than 
distrust-supporting pieces in the vignette. Such an inequality may explain the 
asymmetrical levels of surprise in the ambivalent conditions, which were discussed 
earlier, suggesting generally disfavorable estimations of target trustworthiness on the 
parts of the participants who were given "ambivalent" versions of the story. 
A total of 102 items of information were produced on a rubric for coding. Two 
research assistants matched up content of the written free recall surveys with the itemized 
list of information blocks on the rubric, to determine which of the items were 
remembered from the original story. Cronbach's alphas of .93 for situational or outcome 
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neutral coding, .92 for items supporting trust and .95 for items supporting distrust 
indicated strong inter-rater reliability, similar to Experiment 1. Therefore, the scores were 
again averaged between the two sets of data from the coders, to generate a dataset for a 
dependent variable indicating amounts of recalled-information that supported trust, 
supported distrust, or was situational in nature. 
The amount of recalled pre-outcome information was examined through a 
factorial between subjects, 3 pre-outcome scenario (trust/ambivalent/distrust) X 2 
outcome scenarios (trust/distrust) ANOVA. Six participants were excluded from the 
analysis: one participant did not report outcome-supporting or non-supporting 
information and five others left no responses on their recall task sheets. No significant 
interactions were noted between groups (see Table 14) when examining participants' 
memories for situational or neutral story information, F(2, 173) = .09, ns, nor from 
memories of trust-supporting items F{2, 173) =.46, as well as distrust-supporting items 
F(2, 173) = 1.08, ns. There was a main effect seen for conditions of pre-outcome scenario 
F(l, 173) = 33.71,p<.001, where participants who had read a trust-supporting pre-
outcome scenario (M=4.03, SD=2.0l) and in the ambivalent conditions (M=4.12, 
£0=2.33), were significantly more likely to recall more trust-related items than those who 
had read the distrust pre-outcome scenario, (A^3.12, S!D=1.59). This would be expected 
since participants in those two conditions were given more trust-related information than 
those in the distrust pre-outcome scenarios. There was also a main effect observed for 
trust-related items across conditions of outcome, F(l, 173) = 33.71,p<.001, when those 
who were exposed to a outcome where the target was trustworthy recalled significantly 
more trust-related pieces of information on the average (M=4.55, SD=2.22) than distrust-
related information (M=2.94, £D=1.50). These differences across the conditions are 
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interesting in that each pre-outcome scenario received a uniform amount of trust-related 
information. 
Table 14: 
Experiment 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Recalled Information in Free Recall 
tasks, as a Function of Pre-outcome, Outcome Scenarios and Type of Information. 
Situation Supporting Trust-supporting Distrust-supporting 
Variables 
M SD M SD M SD 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Trusta 4.27 2.09 3.90 1.59 4.03 2.08 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Distrust * 3.83 2.03 2.31 1.28 7.05 3.23 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent 
/ Outcome: Trustc 4.77 2.34 4.73 2.71 3.81 2.46 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent 
/Outcome: Distrustc 4.33 2.53 3.43 1.61 7.83 3.41 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 
Outcome: Trust * 4.78 2.32 5.02 2.09 3.12 1.49 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 
Outcome: Distrust" 4.03 2.29 3.07 1.40 7.57 3.08 
" = Incongruent, b - Congruent,c = Ambivalent 
For the distrust-related recall items, there were significant differences in all 
groups depending on the outcome, F{\, 173) = 89.40,p<.001, with participants recalling 
more distrust related items if they received a distrust outcome (M=7.48, £0=3.21) than 
those who were exposed to a trust outcome (M=3.67, 5D=2.07). It is interesting that no 
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differences in recalled items were observed across the pre-outcome scenarios, since 
participants exposed to trust pre-outcome scenarios received fewer pieces of distrust-
related information than those reading the distrust or the ambivalent pre-outcome 
scenarios. It is also noteworthy that in every pre-outcome scenario, despite receiving the 
uniform amounts of pre-outcome information regarding the target regardless of the 
outcome, there were significant differences in recollection, where participants recalled 
more distrust-related information if they saw a defection outcome. 
As in Experiment 1, the proportions of outcome-supporting information that the 
participants remembered from their vignettes were compared against the proportions of 
outcome-supporting information that were presented. Again, comparison ratios were 
constructed by dividing the amount of outcome-supporting items recalled or presented by 
the total amount of outcome-supporting information and non-outcome-supporting 
information that was recalled or presented (see Tables 15 and 16). The comparison ratios 
were examined once more by using one-sample Mests, to see if and how the participants' 
recollections of outcome-congruent information differed from the proportions of 
information that were presented to them (results on Table 17). Similar patterns were 
observed in the incongruent conditions, where participants recalled significantly higher 
proportion of outcome-supporting items than was presented to them in the vignettes. In 
both congruent conditions, participants recalled significantly lower proportions of 
outcome-supporting information than was presented. Finally, in one ambivalent condition 
with the trust outcome, participants recalled a significantly higher proportion of outcome-
supporting items than was presented to them. It may not be surprising that these results 
resemble the incongruent condition with the distrust pre-outcome and the trust outcome, 
given the observations earlier regarding how the ambivalent conditions left the 
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participants biased toward distrust in much the same way as did the distrust-supporting 
pre-outcome conditions. 
Table 15: 
Experiment 2: Means for Outcome Supporting and Non-Outcome-Supporting Recalled 
Information with Comparison Ratios, as a Function of Pre-outcome and Outcome 
Scenarios. 
Variables 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Trust" 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Distrust * 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent 
/ Outcome: Trustc 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent 
/ Outcome: Distruste 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 
Outcome: Trust * 































































" = Incongruent, = Congruent,c = Ambivalent, d Comparison ratio = Congruent Information 
recalled /Total of Congruent and Incongruent information recalled 
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Table 16: 
Experiment 2: Means for Outcome Supporting and Non-Outcome-Supporting Information 
Presented in the Vignettes with Comparison Ratios, as a Function of Pre-outcome and 
Outcome Scenarios. 
Variables 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Trust" 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 
Outcome: Distrust * 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent 
/ Outcome: Trustc 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent 
/ Outcome: Distrustc 
Pre-outcome: Trust / 
Outcome: Trust * 








































a = Incongruent, = Congruent,c = Ambivalent, Comparison ratio = Congruent Information 
/Total of Congruent and Incongruent information presented 
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Table 17: 
Experiment 2: Means and T-testsfor Free Recall Tasks and Comparisons 
Variables N Comparison Comparison f Cohen's 
Ratio: Ratio: dt 
Recalled Presented 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 30 0.52 0.15 12.60*** 1.70 
Outcome: Trust" 
Pre-outcome: Distrust / 29 0.75 0.85 -5.60*** -1.18 
Outcome: Distrust * 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 32 0.57 0.39 6.57*** 1.28 
Outcome: Trustc 
Pre-outcome: Ambivalent / 29 0.67 0.61 1.81 0.47 
Outcome: Distrustc 
Pre-outcome: Trust/ 29 0.62 0.71 -3.62** -0.88 
Outcome: Trust * 
Pre-outcome: Trust/ 30 0.70 0.29 19.88*** 1.85 
Outcome: Distrust" 
" = Incongruent, = Congruent,c = Ambivalent, " one sample, e Cohen's d > 0 indicates 
higher proportion of recalled information than presented, ** =p<.0\ (2 tailed), *** =p<.00l 
(2 tailed). 
Trust inventories. An examination of both trust inventories indicated marginally 
acceptable reliability for the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Cronbach's a = .68) and showed 
strong reliability the Revised Philosophy of Human Nature (RPHN) Inventory (a = .93), 
as well as the RPHN subscales for both Trust (a = .92) and Cynicism (a = .89). These 
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measures (Table 18), for generalized interpersonal trust were strongly correlated with one 
another, as previously, r (182) =A3,p<.00l. 
Table 18: 
Experiment 2: Means, Standard Deviations, Skew and Kurtosis for the Measures of 
Generalized Trust Expectancies. 
Variable Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Interpersonal Trust 61.89 7.86 0.44 1.77 
Scale (ITS) 








Revised Philosophy of -6.07 13.35 0.48 0.69 
Human Nature 
Inventory (PHN) 
Again, a factorial 3 (pre-outcome scenarios: trust/ambivalent/distrust) X 2 
(outcome: trust/ distrust) ANOVA examining effects for the ITS and the RPHN was 
performed to check if responses were influenced by the experimental manipulation. This 
analysis revealed significant interactions for ITS scores (Tables 19 and 20), 
F(2,l77)=5.72,p<.0l, partial n2=.06, where participants' scores on these trait measures 
varied depending on their conditions of the pre-outcome and outcome scenario. There 
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was also a main effect indicating the ITS scores were influences by pre-outcome 
scenario, F{ 1,177) = 3.21, p<.05, partial n2=.04. 
Table 19: 
Experiment 2: Analysis of Variance Source Table for ITS Measures 
Source df partial r\ 
Pre-Outcome 
Outcome 











Note: *=p<.05, **= p<.01 
Table 20: 
Experiment 2: Analysis of Variance Source Table for RPHN measures. 
Source df partial r\ 
Pre-Outcome 
Outcome 














For the RPHN, significant interactions were observed, F{2,\11) = 4AS,p<.05, 
partial r]2=.05, also indicating influenced trust inventory scores based on combination of 
the pre-outcome and outcome scenarios. These results clearly indicate manipulation 
effects on the trust inventories. The ANCOVA tests that were used in Experiment 1 were 
not performed, as the results are non-interpretable due to the group differences brought 
about by the experimental manipulation. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 exposed a second group of participants to another story about 
dyadic interpersonal trust, regarding a decision of a small business owner to hire a friend. 
As predicted, significant hindsight bias effects were observed in Experiment 2 in both 
incongruent conditions, where participants indicated feelings of surprise at the outcome, 
based on expectations set in the pre-outcome scenarios. A significant hindsight bias was 
observed in an ambivalent condition with the trust outcome, showing a very similar 
pattern to the vignette that had a distrust-pre-outcome and trust outcome. Manipulation 
checks for predictions and surprise ratings indicated the ambivalent conditions did not 
have balance in trust and distrust-supporting statements and, in fact, biased participants to 
distrust the target. The online pilot testing failed to indicate these sizable deviations from 
the desirable central tendencies. This dissimilarity may be a result of differences between 
the online pilot tests and the laboratory-administered procedure. The differences would 
include the difference between the 7-point Likert scale used in the online pilot test versus 
the (more sensitive) continuous 80-point continuous scale used in the laboratory measure. 
While the distrust-biased ambivalent conditions may present as a limitation to the 
experiment, the variables of interest did show the necessary patterns of elevated surprise 
in the incongruent conditions when compared to the congruent and, in kind, did show the 
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predicted patterns in hindsight bias. As the ambivalent conditions operationalized as a 
second set of distrust conditions, the results from these conditions followed the patterns 
predicted by sense-making theory. In effect, these errant ambivalent conditions further 
support the hypothesized predictions. 
Once more, a significant reverse hindsight bias effect was observed in the 
congruent trust-favoring condition, with a second reverse hindsight bias pattern evident in 
the other incongruent condition favoring distrust, which failed to reach statistical 
significance. Here again, no theories directly explain what mechanism may be driving the 
reverse hindsight biases in these judgments where, in both conditions, participants 
reported very low levels of surprise. In fact, this seems contrary to expectation, based 
adjustment theories that anticipate such effects following surprising outcomes (Ofir & 
Mazursky, 1997). Although the trust dilemma in Experiment 2 differed in the content and 
the type of trust judgment from Experiment 1 (i.e., a small business hiring decision 
versus a minor interpersonal loan), the reverse hindsight pattern shows at least some 
consistency across these two different trust situations. Another unanswered question is 
why these unusual responses were activated in both incongruent conditions in this 
procedure and yet only the trust-favoring congruent condition in the previous experiment. 
An interesting line of research would be to pursue just what it is about judgments of trust 
that would invite a reversed hindsight bias trend after witnessing such situations as 
depicted in these experimental conditions. 
For the exploratory measures, our third hypothesis was supported in that 
participants, in all the conditions where a hindsight bias was shown, indicated elevated 
proportions of recalled outcome congruent information, when compared with the 
proportions of information presented to them in the vignettes. This suggests increased 
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accessibility of such information consistent with a sense-making process. In addition to 
the anticipated incongruent conditions, elevated comparison ratios were observed for 
recall in the ambivalent condition where the target acted trustworthy, as well as in the 
congruent condition favoring distrust. As mentioned earlier, based on our manipulation 
check, the ambivalent condition where the target upheld trust likely activated sense-
making in much the same way as did the incongruent condition with the same outcome 
and thus showing both a similar hindsight bias effect as well as the same pattern in the 
recall measures. 
Exploratory analysis of the trust measures revealed significant differences in the 
generalized trust dispositions resulting from the manipulation. It appeared that the week's 
previous story, as well as the retrospection measure and recall test that immediately 
preceded the trust inventories, may have acted as a prime that inadvertently manipulated 
the participants' scores on the ITS and the RPHN. This is interesting because both of 
these inventories are well-used scales to make determinations about people's traits (rather 
than states) regarding generalized expectancies of interpersonal trust. It is possible that a 
two-session experiment may not be adequate to retrieve reliable data on this construct 
and, as such, this casts compelling questions and concerns regarding the fidelity of the 
data that were gathered in the previous experiment as well. Possibly a three-part 
experiment, where the inventory was administered before the primary prediction and 




These experiments investigated whether judgments of trust are susceptible to 
effects as were predicted by the sense-making model of hindsight bias. When exposed to 
third-person scenarios concerning interpersonal trust, hindsight effects were shown to be 
similar to other judgments under uncertainty and were largely consistent with the sense-
making model of hindsight. 
In Experiment 1, a single incongruent condition showed a hindsight bias effect 
when a target was depicted as trustworthy and subsequently defected. The distrust-
supporting pre-outcome conditions failed to sufficiently bias participants' expectations 
toward perceptions of distrust regarding the target, so no effect was seen in the 
incongruent condition with a trust outcome. There are ample interpretations of the sense-
making theories as well as hindsight bias theories that seem to offer explanations of how 
hindsight bias effects might be attenuated in the distrust pre-outcome conditions. The 
attributational explanation process that sense-making hinges upon is theorized to require 
sufficient motivation for the process to continue into a sustained cognitive process 
(Anderson, et al., 1996; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007). Following the sense-making theory 
for hindsight bias, these motivated cognitions are presumably necessary to activate an 
increase of salience regarding the causal antecedents consistent with the outcome and, in 
turn, to bring about the hindsight bias effects. Additionally, the repayment of a small loan 
may have been perceived as such a trivial event that it might have been perceived as a 
"non-event", where hindsight biases have been shown to be small or null (Guilbault, et 
al., 2004; Wasserman, et al., 1991). 
It was hoped that better-adjusted manipulations might show the desired 
deviations toward or away from trust of the target in subsequent designs. Accordingly, in 
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Experiment 2, a more balanced set of manipulations yielded the hypothesized 
interactions, as hindsight biases were observed in both incongruent conditions. The 
ambivalent conditions deviated from the midpoint in the direction of a bias toward 
distrust. As such, they shared the general response patterns that were more consistent 
with the distrust pre-outcome scenarios and can be said to further support our predictions 
from the sense-making model. 
Some discussion is warranted regarding the intriguing reverse hindsight bias 
effect seen in both experiments, where participants' retrospective ratings of the target's 
trustworthiness dropped significantly when compared to the prediction ratings, in the 
congruent conditions with a trust pre-outcome and a trust outcome. Such reversed effects 
have been observed in hindsight bias research and are not without precedent. However 
the sense-making theory of hindsight bias failed to predict this pattern in these conditions 
and no other theories of hindsight bias appear to offer direct explanations for these cases. 
For instance, Ofir and Mazursky (1997) theorized that surprising responses on the part of 
participants might lead to a reversed hindsight bias effect. Given that the reports of 
surprise were lowest in this category, such expectation-based theories can also be 
considered an unsustainable explanation. Other research showed reversed hindsight bias 
effects for individuals who have received personally relevant and negative health 
information (Renner, 2003) or in subjects with low scores in need for cognition measures 
(Verplanken & Pieters, 1988). 
One possible answer may lie in the nature of distrust-supporting information as 
compared to trust-supporting information. Negative and distrust-related cognitions, by 
their very nature, tend to be cognitively higher-activating, more salient and more 
memorable than positive and trust-related cognitions (Baumeister, et al., 2001; Schul, 
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Mayo, & Burnstein, 2008). The reverse hindsight bias effects seen here may be simply a 
degradation of the participants' representations of the target's trustworthiness over time, 
where the more hardy distrust-related representations were unaffected.4 Such an 
interpretation could be considered consistent with the foundational assumptions of the 
cognitive reconstruction theories that hindsight bias as a core memory phenomenon, is 
driven by changes of cognitive representations between the points of prediction and 
retrospection. Although the sense-making theories offer a powerful way to understand 
hindsight bias, one is well served to remember that recollection of predictions are 
vulnerable to any changes in representation which could happen due to a variety of 
causes. Such causes would certainly include exposure to sets of highly perishable pre-
outcome information. 
Exploratory measures produced a mixed, yet equally intriguing, set of results. A 
foundational assumption of the cognitive reconstruction frameworks is that an individual 
searches and retrieves sampling evidence available in long-term memory and that 
outcome-consistent information is more easily recalled and drives the "bias" in hindsight 
(Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Sense-making theories propose that a motivated cognitive 
explanation process will increase the accessibility of information in certain conditions: 
specifically, in situations where the outcome information is not congruent with pre-
outcome expectations. In the conditions where hindsight was observed, the free recall 
task produced the predicted patterns in the increased retention of outcome-consistent 
4 This effect also serves as a powerful illustration in an experiment of how perishable a 
reputation of trustworthiness is, versus the hardy nature of a non-trustworthy reputation. 
This is certainly a well-documented theme in social psychology and trust literature (Kim, 
Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Lewicki, et al., 1995; Schul, et al., 2008). 
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information in the participants' recollections of the stories in incongruent conditions, 
which is consistent with and further supports the sense-making theories. 
Analysis of the trust measures indicated surprisingly little relationship to our 
variables of interest. However, issues with the design may have rendered these measures 
less meaningful. In the case of Experiment 2, it appears that our own manipulation may 
have impacted the results of the inventories, as the mean scores on this trait measure 
varied to a statistically significant degree, depending on the combination of conditions 
that the participants received. The fact that these results varied at all suggests some 
relationship between these types of trust decisions and the inventories. It certainly invites 
speculation and scientific questioning in hopes of learning more about this effect. Further 
research may be warranted to investigate the effects of individual differences on 
hindsight biases during trust judgments, perhaps using a different experimental design, 
more personally-focused vignettes, or simply using different inventories. 
An important issue of the current research is the calibration of the instruments 
used to manipulate trust judgments and in turn measure hindsight bias. There are 
undeniable challenges pertaining to internal validity concerning interpersonal trust, 
especially with regard to confounds. It should be noted that theorists have long proposed 
that trust and distrust ought not be thought of as residing on a single continuum, but two 
parallel and opposing processes, which operationalize differently and have asymmetrical 
antecedents and consequences. In consideration of this "two-factor model" (Lewicki, et 
al., 1998), our measurement tool, which was a single bi-polar continuum capturing 
approach or avoidance cognitions relative to a target, may seem somewhat "messy" if not 
outright confounded. Therefore, it may not be surprising to see asymmetry among the 
manipulations and, as well, as the resulting hindsight bias effects. 
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In daily social interaction, humans are making often-important predictions of 
reliance as they deliberate matters of trust. Hindsight bias is a frequently occurring and 
possibly detrimental effect that occurs during and after a predictive judgment. If the 
hindsight bias effect indicates a failure for people to accurately recall their own 
predictions, then they are unlikely to learn from one's decisions (or mistakes), if they are 
unable to accurately access them in memory. In decisions of trust, when one incurs 
certain vulnerabilities based on such predictions, these lapses could prove to be of a 
recurring and perhaps highly problematic nature. 
The goal of this experiment was to investigate if the previous evidence that 
supported the sense-making theories for hindsight bias could generalize into new 
domains and types of judgments, specifically those regarding interpersonal trust. Looking 
forward, we see strong opportunities in the pursuit of a fruitful line of research in both the 
laboratory as well as applied or quasi-experimental study. 
Trust research in the laboratory can encounter important limitations in 
generalizability and external validity (Good, 1991) and clearly this project contended 
with some of those issues. In subsequent research, it would be desirable to move away 
from third person trust vignettes and model more personally-relevant judgments of trust, 
including first-person decision-making. Also, since people's life experience informs their 
decisions regarding who or what is trustworthy, expanding from the college-aged 
convenience sample to examine other age cohorts would also be advisable. 
Future research could also examine the effects of hindsight bias following 
outcomes of other types of trust. These applications would include study of business 
outcomes, legal decisions, organizational trust, first-person trust decisions, shocking or 
personally relevant outcomes and repeated mistakes in judgments of trust. Such research 
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could go far to add to the scientific literature in providing a fuller understanding of trust 
and hindsight bias, as well as to help us adaptively learn from or mitigate the damage 
from the sometimes costly blunders of mistaken trust decisions. 
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Appendix A 
Third Person Trust Scenarios - Four Vignettes 
VIGNETTE #1 
Mark is a student at a medium-sized university, who works part-time as he attends 
school. Jim is a roommate of Mark's, who approached him one morning to borrow $20. 
In his circle of friends, it is not uncommon to have loans like this and is something of a 
norm. Money has been pretty tight lately and Mark would definitely need the money back 
for his trip at the end of the month, so he had to weigh carefully whether or not to lend 
the $20 to Jim. 
All and all, Mark tends to like Jim a lot. There are times when Mark finds Jim 
annoying. Mark has known Jim for more than three years. He feels he knows him pretty 
well. As long as Mark has known Jim, Mark still considers him "a hard guy to figure 
out." Mark and Jim hang around in the same circle of friends. They are all pretty tight. 
Jim has struck Mark as moody - and seems a bit aloof at times. Jim has a job that pays 
reasonably well. There should be no problem paying the loan back. Jim sometimes seems 
to struggle with his finances and on occasion even paying some bills. Mark has known 
Jim to be mostly reliable, keeping his appointments and obligations to his friends. On 
occasion, Mark has known Jim to have lapses in integrity, which include lying to 
girlfriends and sometimes cheating on exams. Mark considers Jim a close friend. At 
times, Mark wishes Jim respected him more. On certain occasions, Mark has borrowed 
money from Jim in the past as well and Jim has been reliable in making loans when Mark 
asked. Jim has complained when Mark previously borrowed money. Jim has had to 
borrow money before from Mark and loans are not uncommon between the two 
roommates. Mark can't help but to think that he seems to loan money to Jim a little too 
often. Over the years, Jim has usually been very reliable in paying back Mark. And 
unfortunately, the last time Jim borrowed money from Mark, it took weeks and constant 
reminders to get the money back. 
Mark has to decide whether or not to lend the $20 to Jim, as Jim, on his way to an 
appointment, anxiously awaits his reply... 
VIGNETTE #2 
Melanie and Andrew are co-coworkers who happen to live on the same hall in a 
downtown apartment building. Melanie and Andrew work as associates a powerful and 
very conservative corporate law firm. The partners in the company tend to be older and 
very traditionalist males. Melanie graduated near the top of her class and is a popular, 
driven, hard working professional who is considered to be on a partnership track. Melanie 
is considered a peer to Andrew and both have worked there for a number of years. 
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Melanie also happens to be gay and is in a serious long-term relationship with 
another woman. Mindful of the conservative climate, she has not disclosed this to anyone 
at work yet, as she doesn't want it to impact her chances of being a partner down the road. 
Early one morning while Andrew was heading to work Melanie was caught in a long 
embrace outside her apartment with her life-partner. 
Later that morning Melanie and Andrew encountered each other again in a long 
line at the coffee stand. They had to wait while the attendant finished brewing a new pot. 
Andrew mentioned that he saw Melanie in the hallway and asked, "Who's your friend?" 
Melanie's heart started to race, as she quickly thought whether she should disclose her 
relationship to her co-worker or not... 
All and all, Melanie tends to like Andrew very much. Sometimes Andrew says 
things that really rub Melanie the wrong way. Melanie is in fact probably as close with 
Andrew as anyone at the firm. Melanie often discovers things about Andrew that 
surprises and disappoints her in him. Melanie has confided in Andrew before and they 
frequently share small talk and idle gossip - usually nothing harmful or malicious. 
Melanie was once taken aback by some mean-spirited gossip shared by Andrew about 
another very unpopular associate. Melanie has even been invited to dinner at Andrew's 
house, repeatedly, to enjoy Sunday dinner with his family. Melanie has even gotten 
invitations for joining Andrew's family for Thanksgiving dinner. Melanie has declined 
dinner invitations to Andrew's house because she is a vegetarian. Andrew often makes 
fun of Melanie's vegetarianism, so Melanie wanted to avoid uncomfortable situations 
there. Confidentiality and discretion are a big part of a lawyer's job, so Melanie knows 
that Andrew should be able to keep a secret. Since both Melanie and Andrew are 
partnership tracked, anything that might compromise Melanie's reputation might increase 
Andrew's chances of advancement. Andrew has had a good reputation for integrity and 
forthrightness within the law firm. Melanie has known Andrew to have lapses in 
integrity - for instance, one time Melanie overheard Andrew lying to his spouse about 
going out after work. Melanie considers Andrew a good friend. Melanie sometimes 
wishes Andrew respected her more. Melanie admires that Andrew volunteers in soup 
kitchens and participates in community and church volunteer efforts during his time off. 
Melanie was taken aback when Andrew, was approached by a panhandler outside the 
office and replied, "Get a job!" Andrew, unasked, helped move a sofa into Melanie's 
apartment. Andrew, once declined to assist Melanie with a pro-bono case saying "What's 
in it for me?" Andrew, told Melanie that he enjoys doing criminal defense work because 
"everyone, no matter how poor or desperate, deserves good legal representation." 
Melanie was shocked at Andrew, when he described his criminal defendant clientele as 
being "Total scumbags — every one of them." 
Melanie's knew that she had to say something, but she wasn't sure if Andrew was safe 
to tell... 
VIGNETTE #3 
John owns and operates a miniature golf course in a seaside resort area. The 
summer is a busy time for the course and John needs help running the course since he 
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can't be there all the time. Chip lives next door to John's golf course and John knows 
Chip. He is eager to find a job and called John, to see if he could work at the course. John 
told Chip he had to think about it and to come up to the course and talk more about it 
later in the afternoon... 
The miniature golf course is a "cash-based business" - so it would be really easy 
to steal from the moneybox. Therefore the person that John hires should be fairly 
trustworthy, or the business simply won't make ends meet. 
John needs to find someone to hire for the course in the next day or so, in time for 
the weekend. Chip knows this and is waiting for the decision as John weighs the pros and 
cons of hiring Chip... 
Chip is one of John's oldest friends - both had grown up and went to school 
together. Chip and John have grown apart in the last few years - Chip seems to really 
enjoy his single lifestyle as well as partying and carousing; while John is definitely more 
of a family guy and is more "settled down." Chip often calls John his oldest and very best 
friend, speaking well in appreciation of his relationship to John. Chip has not had "good 
luck" in maintaining relationships - either within their circle of friends, or in his romantic 
ones (he's divorced and a long line of ex-girlfriends). Chip assured John that he would be 
his very best employee. Chip has had a hard time staying in school, or keeping a job. 
Chip noted to John that he's never, ever let down John, as long as they've known each 
other - which is true. While it's true that Chip has never let down John, Chip has been 
known to let down others. Chip borrowed his brother's car last month and wrecked it in 
an uninsured accident. Chip couldn't pay for the repairs and his brother got stuck with the 
bill. John thinks Chip is a genuinely good guy and that Chip would do anything for his 
fellow man. John knows Chip is a guy who "has some problems" and has struggles with 
alcohol and cocaine use over the years, which has cost him some friends over time. John 
has never known Chip to "BS" or lie to him. They have always had a truthful and candid 
relationship. There's a lot of genuine respect between the two friends. John knows that 
Chip has been lying to and avoiding his ex-wife, who is looking for past-due alimony 
payments. John knows that the job at the golf course is not too complex - just stand 
behind the counter, hand out golf balls and putters and collect money - so Chip should be 
easily able to handle the job. John can't pay a lot for this position and he worries that 
Chip might be tempted with all that cash - plus, there is almost no way to monitor the 
cash drawer and protect from petty theft when John's not there. Chip is a genuinely 
friendly, very articulate and outgoing guy - so John knows that Chip should be able to 
handle customers well. Chip looks and dresses like a hippy - he seldom shaves and has 
long hair well past his shoulders and keeps a generally scruffy appearance - so John 
worries that family-based customers may find Chip's appearance a little off-putting. 
When given a choice between hiring a friend and hiring a stranger, John knows he'd 
rather hire a friend, like Chip, as you would get more loyalty out of a friend than 
someone you don't really know. John has seen Chip burn friends before - and, even 
though they continue to have a great friendship, wonders if Chip could someday let him 
down. 
John sees Chip walking up the sidewalk to the golf course. John now has to 
decide what to tell him as to whether or not he'll hire Chip to help operate his cash 
business. 
VIGNETTE #4 
Megan is a female college sophomore who has recently begun her school year 
after spending the summer in her hometown. When Megan went home over the summer 
break and was at a party, she met a boy. They had a brief fling, that only lasted a few 
days right before both had to return to their respective schools. At school, Megan has a 
number of casual friends and acquaintances and has an active social life. Yet despite that, 
she can't think of anyone at school that she would describe as a "best friend." Megan 
doesn't always find it easy to "open up" and simply hasn't known anyone at school long 
enough or well enough to call her "best friend." Probably, Megan's closest friend at 
school is her roommate, Amber. 
One Friday evening, two weeks into her semester Megan began to have reasons to 
suspect she may be pregnant. An at home pregnancy test was positive. Megan found this 
to be surprising and upsetting news. Later that night while out with friends, Amber 
noticed that Megan was unusually quiet, visibly upset, keeping to herself and not 
drinking alcohol. So Amber asked Megan "Is anything wrong?" 
Megan started tearing up, quickly excused herself and headed to the bathroom. It 
was the weekend and no student counselors were available at her college. She wasn't 
ready to tell her parents yet, nor was she ready to discuss it with the boy. In fact, she 
hasn't told anyone yet and certainly doesn't want the world to know while she ponders her 
options. But she feels a need to talk about her predicament with somebody. Should she go 
back and tell Amber? For a moment, Megan pondered the pros and cons of whether 
Amber could be trusted with knowing about her secret... 
Megan really likes Amber, probably more than anyone else at the college. Megan 
still thinks there is quite a lot that she doesn't know about Amber, since they have only 
known one another for about a year. Megan and Amber both have similar backgrounds 
and are pretty "simpatico", sharing similar interests and temperaments. Megan and 
Amber sometimes squabble about small things. Megan and Amber get along well 
together and tend to have long "girl-talk" conversations. Megan wonders if Amber might 
make her the subject of "girl-talk" with someone else — and perhaps let her secret slip 
out. Megan thinks that Amber is basically dependable and can be counted on for small 
things or favors - like sharing a ride to school or borrowing money from. There are times 
when Megan wishes Amber was more reliable - like when Amber blows off doing her 
household chores or writing out her rent check on time. Megan feels that Amber is 
basically a good person. Amber often acts out of generosity and can be fairly considerate. 
There are times that Amber says or does things that rubs Megan the wrong way and finds 
really frustrating - and thinks that Amber can sometimes be a bit forceful and insensitive. 
Based on what little Megan knows about Amber, she seems to think that Amber has had a 
lot of life experiences and sometimes can give pretty good advice. Megan thinks that 
Amber can be pretty negative, strongly opinionated, judgmental and disapproving at 
times. Amber is known to be a good listener when it comes to people talking about their 
problems and appears to give people a lot of time when someone comes to her with a 
crisis. Megan remembers Amber once complaining about how people always come to her 
about their problems. Megan hears Amber frequently talk about "doing the right thing." 
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and knows Amber to be a spiritual and morally grounded person. Amber has very strong 
religious beliefs and while Megan doesn't have a problem with religion, she wonders if 
Amber's devout beliefs might affect her opinions about this issue, as well as affect 
Amber's opinions of Megan's moral character. Megan has never known Amber to be 
malicious or unkind toward her. Megan has seen Amber be unkind toward others: once 
when riding together, Megan saw Amber fly into a fit of road rage at an old person who 
was driving too slow, yelling, honking and cutting them off. 
When Megan returned, to the group Amber quietly brought her aside and said, "Hey, 
obviously there's something very wrong ~ Want to talk about it?" 
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Appendix B 
Date Posted: IRB/COSHSC#: 
Project: Connections (online) 
DESCRIPTION: The purpose of this study is to investigate how people comprehend 
situations and make judgments. You will be asked to read texts and answer questions or 
make judgments about the texts. This experiment is a one (l)-session study that should 
take no longer than one (1) hour. 
CREDIT: Each session will take up to one (1) hour. You will receive one (1) credit 
for the one hour online session. 
QUALIFICATIONS: Anyone who has not participated in a previous session of this 
study is eligible to participate. 
LOCATION and TIME: This is an online survey, so student volunteers may 
participate at times of their own discretion and gain access through the SONA system. 
Volunteers should have access to a continuous (unbroken) Internet connection. Be 
advised that there might also be periods of system unavailability or maintenance that 
could prevent connecting to the SONA system or the survey. 
PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR: 
Ivan K. Ash, Ph.D. 
Contact Information 
iash@odu.edu 
Office MGB 132 E 
Phone 757-683-4446 
Appendix C 
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It) Sept 200/ 
MEMO 
TO: Di Ash (PSYCH) 
FROM: Christopher Osgood, Chair. Collogo of Sciences Human Subjects Committor! (CO) 
RE: Your romnt proprawil, 007 OB 003, "Connections 
Your rocont submission to the COS I lurmin Subjects Committee has boon found to exempt from IRH review. 
You niiiy buuin your experimentation. Please not© that this approval uxlends tor one yoor from today's date. 
II you wish to modify or extend the protocol, plusise contact the Collcrjo of ScionciiK regarding your request. 
90 
Appendix D 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY Notification Document {Online) 
The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect your decision 
whether to say YES or NO to participation in this research. 
PROJECT TITLE: "Project Connections Online" 
DESCRIPTION: You are being asked to participate in a study on situation 
comprehension and judgment making. You will be asked to read information from the 
computer screen and answer questions about this information. This is a one session, 
hour-long study. The second session will meet in this same location at the same time 
one-week from today. You are being asked to participate in both sessions. 
EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA: You must not have participated in a previous session 
of this study. 
RISKS: There are no known risks associated with this study besides those associated 
with normal everyday use of computers. 
BENEFITS: There is no cost or payment associated with your participation in this 
investigation. The researchers want your decision about participation in this study to be 
absolutely voluntary. You will receive no direct benefit from this research. 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will receive a total of 1 Psychology 
department research credit for one hour of participation, which may be applied to course 
requirements or extra credit in certain Psychology courses. Equivalent credits may be 
obtained in other ways. You do not have to participate in this research study, or any 
Psychology department study, in order to obtain this credit. 
CONFIDENTIALITY: You will be assigned a participant code and this number (not 
your name) will be used to organize all data and records collected. Your name will not 
be kept with or associated with the data collected. The only records that contain 
identifying information (the consent form and the forms used to record your participation 
credit) will be separated from your other documents and the data collected. All records 
will be stored in a locked file cabinet in a locked room accessible only to authorized 
University staff and faculty. The results of this study may be used in reports, 
presentations and publications; but the researchers will not identify you. Of course, your 
records may be subpoenaed by court order or inspected by government bodies with 
oversight authority. 
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE: It is OK for you to say NO. You may refuse to 
participate in or withdraw from this study at any time. If you do, there will be no penalty 
assigned to you whatsoever. PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND THIS 
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RIGHT. If you ever feel uncomfortable or have any questions about your participation, 
please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter, Dr Ivan Ash, by email (iash@odu.edu) 
or by phone at his office at (757) 683-4446. We have as our primary responsibility to 
ensure your health, safety and wellbeing and will do everything available to us to make 
sure your needs are given the most consideration. The researchers reserve the right to 
withdraw your participation in this study, at any time, if they observe potential problems 
with your continued participation. 
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY: If you say YES, then your consent 
in this document does not waive any of your legal rights. However, in the event of injury 
arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are able to 
give you any money, insurance coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation 
for such injury. In the event that you suffer injury as a result of participation in any 
research project please contact Old Dominion University Office of Research, at (757) 
683-3460. 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT: When you hit "NEXT" below and proceed to the following 
pages, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read this form or have 
had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, the research study 
and its risks and benefits. If you have any questions later on, then the researchers should 
be able to answer them: 
Dr. Ivan K. Ash at iash@odu.edu or (757) 683-4446. 
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your 
rights or this form, then you should call the Old Dominion University Office of Research, 
at 757-683-3460. 
And importantly, when you hit the "NEXT" button and advance to the next page, you are 
indicating to the researcher YES, that you are a volunteer and agree to participate in this 
study. Upon request, the researcher can give you a copy of this form for your records, or 
you may print it out now. 
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Appendix E 
Online Debrief Page 
, '<Back) ("Finish ) (Save) 
Congratulations... 
You finished the survey. 
Wc appreciate your time and attention to this procedure. 
The experiments you participate in can serve as educational opportunities, which allow you to learn a 
little about how psychologists study the nature or behavior, beliefs, emotions, and cognition. This 
procedure examines reactions and responses to tour short stories that are designed to present a third-
person dilemma regarding interpersonal trust. This material may be used in future research on this 
topic. Since these are original stories, it was necessary (o see to what degree the scenarios (and all of 
their separate sentences and components) might address and measure the construct of "trust." 
Since this is ongoing research, we would ask that you refrain from discussing specifics of this study 
with other classmates, or anyone that may be taking a psychology class this semester. This will help 
us prevent contamination or influencing of future subjects, and insure that this research — as well as 
your time — is all worthwhile. 




Date Posted: IRB/COSHSC #: 007-08-003 
Project: Connections (On Site) 
DESCRIPTION: The purpose of this study is to investigate how 
people comprehend situations and make judgments. You will be asked to 
read texts and answer questions or make judgments about the texts. This 
experiment is a two (2)-session study with one of the two sessions occurring 
on different days exactly one week apart. Each session will take up to one 
(1) hour. You will be asked to sign up for both sessions at once. 
CREDIT: Each session will take up to one (1) hour. You will receive one 
(1) credit for the first session and one (1) credits for the second session, for a 
total of two (2) credits. 
QUALIFICATIONS: Anyone who has not participated in a previous 
session or version of this study is eligible to participate. 
LOCATION and TIME: Refer to the sign-up sheet in the folder on the 
door of the Psychology Research Administrator's office (MGB 128) labeled 
CONNECTIONS for available times and locations. You must sign up for 
both sessions at the same time. 
PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR: 
Ivan K. Ash, Ph.D. 
Contact Information 
iash@odu.edu 
























Mark is a student at a medium-sized university, who works 
part-time as he attends school. 
Jim is a roommate of Mark's, who approached him one 
morning to borrow $20. 
In their circle of friends, it is not uncommon to have loans 
like this and is something of a norm. 
Money has been pretty tight lately and Mark would definitely 
need the money back for his trip at the end of the month, so 
he had to weigh carefully whether or not to lend the $20 to 
Jim. 
All and all, Mark tends to like Jim a lot. 
There are times when Mark finds Jim annoying. 
Mark and Jim hang around in the same circle of friends and 
they are all a pretty tight group. 
Jim has struck Mark as moody and seems a bit aloof at times. 
Jim has a job that pays reasonably well, so there should be no 
problem paying the loan back. 
Jim sometimes seems to struggle with his finances and on 
occasion even paying some bills. 
On certain occasions, Mark has borrowed money from Jim in 
the past as well and Jim has been reliable in making loans 
when Mark asked. 
Jim has complained when Mark previously borrowed money. 
Mark has known Jim to be mostly reliable, keeping his 
appointments and obligations to his friends. 
On occasion, Mark has known Jim to have lapses in integrity, 
which include lying to girlfriends and sometimes cheating on 
exams. 





































At times, Mark wishes Jim respected him more. 
Mark has known Jim for more than three years, so he feels he 
knows Jim pretty well. 
As long as Mark has known Jim, Mark still considers him "a 
hard guy to figure out." 
Jim has had to borrow money before from Mark and loans are 
not uncommon between the two roommates. 
Mark can't help but to think that he seems to loan money to 
Jim a little too often. 
Over the years, Jim has usually been very reliable in paying 
back Mark. 
And unfortunately, the last time Jim borrowed money from 
Mark, it took weeks and constant reminders to get the money 
back. 
Mark has to decide whether or not to lend the $20 to Jim, as 

































Mark knew he had the money to lend Jim but quickly reviewed 
the reasons whether or not to loan the $20 to Jim. 
Jim gently but anxiously reminded Mark that he had to go and 
needed to know if he had the money to lend him. 
Mark after a moment said, "okay" and gave Jim a $20 bill. Jim 
smiled and thanked him... 
As Mark returned to what he was doing, Jim turned and left the 
room in a hurry to his appointment. 
For the next several days, life went on much as it did before. 
Relations stayed cordial between the two roommates. 
One morning, Jim walked in quietly as Mark was eating 
breakfast and slapped a $20 bill on the table. After a second he 
said "Thanks for the loan last week," and went on to make 























Mark knew he had the money to lend Jim but quickly reviewed 
the reasons whether or not to loan the $20 to Jim. 
Jim gently but anxiously reminded Mark that he had to go and 
needed to know if he had the money to lend him. 
Mark after a moment said, "okay" and gave Jim a $20 bill. Jim 
smiled and thanked him... 
As Mark returned to what he was doing, Jim turned and left the 
room in a hurry to his appointment. 
For the next several days, life went on much as it did before. 
Relations stayed cordial between the two roommates, but after 
a while, Mark started to wonder when he would see his money. 
As time progressed, Mark began to resent Jim for being slow 
in paying him back. They started to have small disagreements 
about a variety of things and the relationship distinctly chilled. 
During one heated disagreement Mark brought up the issue of 















OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY Notification Document (Onsite) 
The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect your decision 
whether to say YES or NO to participation in this research and to record the consent of 
those who say YES. 
PROJECT TITLE: "Project Connections" 
DESCRIPTION: You are being asked to participate in a study on situation 
comprehension and judgment making. You will be asked to read information from paper 
booklets or computer screens and answer questions about this information. This is a two-
session study. The second session will meet in this same location at the same time one-
week from today. You are being asked to participate in both sessions 
EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA: You must not have participated in a previous session 
of this study. 
RISKS: There are no known risks associated with this study besides those associated 
with normal everyday classroom use of computers and booklets. 
BENEFITS: There is no cost or payment associated with your participation in this 
investigation. The researchers want your decision about participation in this study to be 
absolutely voluntary. You will receive no direct benefit from this research. 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will receive a total of 2 Psychology 
department research credits (one for the first session and two for second session), which 
may be applied to course requirements or extra credit in certain Psychology courses. 
Equivalent credits may be obtained in other ways. You do not have to participate in this 
research study, or any Psychology department study, in order to obtain this credit. 
CONFIDENTIALITY: You will be assigned a participant code and this number (not 
your name) will be used to organize all data and records collected. Your name will not 
be kept with or associated with the data collected. The only records that contain 
identifying information (the consent form and the forms used to record your participation 
credit) will be separated from your other documents and the data collected. All records 
will be stored in a locked file cabinet in a locked room accessible only to authorized 
University staff and faculty. The results of this study may be used in reports, 
presentations and publications; but the researchers will not identify you. Of course, your 
records may be subpoenaed by court order or inspected by government bodies with 
oversight authority. 
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WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE: It is OK for you to say NO. You may refuse to 
participate in or withdraw from this study at any time. If you do, there will be no penalty 
assigned to you whatsoever. PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND THIS 
RIGHT. If you ever feel uncomfortable or have any questions about your participation, 
please do not hesitate to inform the experimenter. We have as our primary responsibility 
to ensure your health, safety and wellbeing and will do everything available to us to make 
sure your needs are given the most consideration. The researchers reserve the right to 
withdraw your participation in this study, at any time, if they observe potential problems 
with your continued participation. 
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY: If you say YES, then your consent 
in this document does not waive any of your legal rights. However, in the event of injury 
arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are able to 
give you any money, insurance coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation 
for such injury. In the event that you suffer injury as a result of participation in any 
research project please contact Old Dominion University Office of Research, at 
757-683-3460. 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT: By signing this form, you are saying several things. You 
are saying that you have read this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied 
that you understand this form, the research study and its risks and benefits. The 
researchers should have answered any questions you may have had about the research. If 
you have any questions later on, then the researchers should be able to answer them: 
Dr. Ivan K. Ash at iash@odu.edu or (757) 683-4446. 
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your 
rights or this form, then you should call the Old Dominion University Office of Research, 
at 757-683-3460. 
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to 
participate in this study. Upon request, the researcher can give you a copy of this form 
for your records. 
Date Signature of Participant 
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Appendix J 
GENERAL OPINION SURVEY 
(Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale) 
INSTRUCTIONS: This is a questionnaire to determine the attitudes and beliefs of 
different people on a variety of statements. 
Please answer the statements by giving as true a picture of your own beliefs as possible. 
Be sure to answer each item carefully and show your beliefs by selecting the appropriate 
choice. 
(Likert Scale Responses) 
Scoring: 
(1) Strongly Agree (I); Mildly Agree (2); Agree and Disagree equally (3); 
Mildly disagree (4); Strongly Disagree (5) 
Reverse scoring: 
Strongly Agree (5); Mildly Agree (4); Agree and Disagree equally (3); 








Most people would rather live in a climate that is mild all year round than 
in one in which the winters are cold. 
. ' ; ' " • - 7 . ' ; - ' - ' - " • ; ; ; * - ' ; - " v ' ' < <••'•'.'•./ 
Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. 
,•;<.'. i : , / ; . V . .*( (>;<: \(.i 
In dealing with strangers, one is better off to be cautious until they have 
provided evidence that they are trustworthy. 
.'.•-..-•' / r.\i- S ' \ ; R ; \ : - ; 
This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people into 
politics. 
:-,:• li.K^i: S((J/tl:v'.,, 
Fear of social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience prevents 
most people from breaking the law. 
: . . : . ' J7.ft.V-' Y Old - . / . ! 
Parents can usually be relied upon to keep their promises. 
'.V; - ; . u ! - ' 7 i V CKIMi, 
The advice of elders is often poor because the older person doesn't 
recognize how times have changed. 


















Using the Honor System of NOT having a teacher present during exams 
would probably result in increased cheating. 
The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping world 
peace. 
Parents and teachers are likely to say what they believe themselves and 
not just what they think is good for the child to hear. 
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do. 
As evidenced by recent books and movies, morality seems on the 
downgrade in this country. 
The judiciary is a place where we can get unbiased treatment. 
It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say, most people are 
primarily interested in their own welfare. 
The future seems very promising. 
Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news the public 
sees and hears is distorted. 
Seeking advice from several people is more likely to confuse than it is to 
help. 
Most elected public officials are really sincere in their campaign 
promises. 
There is no simple way of deciding who is telling the truth. 
This country has progressed to the point where we can reduce the amount 
of competitiveness encouraged by schools and parents. 
Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio and television, it is 
hard to get objective accounts of public events. 
It is more important that people achieve happiness than greatness. 
Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the limits of their 
knowledge. 

















One should not attack the political beliefs of others. 
In these competitive times, one has to be alert or someone is likely to 
take advantage of you. 
Children need to be given more guidance by teachers and parents than 
they now typically get. 
Most rumors usually have a strong element of truth. 
Many major national sport contests are fixed in one way or another. 
A good leader who molds the opinions of the group is leading rather than 
merely following the wishes of the majority. 
Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach. 
Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. 
Education in this country is not really preparing young men and women 
to deal with the problems of the future. 
Most students would not cheat even if they were sure of getting away 
with it. 
The hordes of students now going to college are going to find it more 
difficult to find good jobs when they graduate than did the college 
graduates of the past. 
Most repair men will not overcharge even if they think you are ignorant 
of their specialty. 
A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies are 
phony. 
One should not attack the religious beliefs of other people. 
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly. 
If we really knew what was going on in international politics, the public 
would have more reason to be frightened than they now seem to. 
Appendix K 
Revised Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (RPHN) 
This questionnaire is a series of attitude statements. Each represents a commonly held 
opinion and there is no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some 
items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with matters of opinion. 
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with the statement by selecting a response for each statement. 
Revised Philosophies of Human Nature Scale 
1. If most people could get into a movie without paying and be 
sure that they would not be seen, they would do it. 
2. Most people have the courage of their convictions. 
3. The average person is conceited. 
4. Most people try to apply the Golden Rule, even in today's 
complex society. 
5. Most people would stop and help a person whose car was 
disabled. 
6. The typical student will cheat on a test when everybody else 
does, even though he has a set of ethical standards. 
7. Most people do not hesitate to go out of their way to help 
someone who is in trouble. 
8. Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it. 
9. It's pathetic to see an unselfish person in todays would because 
so many people would take advantage of him. 
10. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" is a 
motto that most people follow. 
11. People claim that they have ethical standards regarding 
honesty and morality, but few people stick to them when the 
chips are down. 
12. Most people will speak out for what they believe in. 
13. People pretend to care more about one another than they really 
do. 
14. People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would 
be better off lying. 
15. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help 
other people. 
16. Most people would cheat on their income tax if they had the 
chance. 





















right, even if others disagree. 
18. Most people will act as "Good Samaritans" if given the 
opportunity 
19. Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; 
they're afraid of getting caught. 





5 point Likert scale: 
Agree strongly +3 
Agree somewhat +2 
Agree slightly +1 
Disagree slightly -1 
Disagree somewhat -2 
Disagree strongly -3 
Appendix L 


















John owns and operates a miniature golf course in a seaside 
resort area. 
The summer is a busy time for the course and John needs help 
running the course since he can't be there all the time. 
Chip lives next door to John's golf course and John knows 
Chip. He is eager to find a job and called John, to see if he 
could work at the course. 
John told Chip he had to think about it and to come up to the 
course and talk more about it later in the afternoon... 
The miniature golf course is a "cash-based business" - so it 
would be really easy to steal from the moneybox. Therefore, 
the person that John hires should be fairly trustworthy, or the 
business simply won't make ends meet. 
John needs to find someone to hire for the course in the next 
day or so, in time for the weekend. Chip knows this and is 
waiting for the decision as John weighs the pros and cons of 
hiring Chip... 
Chip is one of John's oldest friends. - both grew up and went 
to school together. 
Chip and John have grown apart in the last few years -Chip 
seems to really enjoy his single lifestyle as well as partying 
and carousing; while John is definitely more of a family guy 
and is more "settled down." 
Chip often calls John his oldest and very best friend, speaking 
well in appreciation of his relationship to John. 
Chip has not had "good luck" in maintaining relationships — 
either within their circle of friends, or in his romantic ones 
(he's divorced and a long line of ex-girlfriends). 
Chip assured John that he would be his very best employee. 
Chip has had a hard time staying in school, or keeping a job. 
Chip noted to John that he's never, ever let down John, as 
long as they've known each other - which is true. 
While it's true that Chip has never let down John, Chip has 
been known to let down others: like when Chip borrowed his 
brother's car and totaled it in an uninsured accident. 
John thinks Chip is a genuinely good guy and that Chip would 




































John knows Chip is a guy who "has some problems" and has 
struggled with alcohol and cocaine use over the years, which 
has cost him some friends over time. 
John has never known Chip to "BS" or lie to him. They have 
always had a truthful and candid relationship. There's a lot of 
genuine respect between the two friends. 
John knows that Chip has been lying to and avoiding his ex-
wife, who is looking for past-due alimony payments. 
John knows that the job at the golf course is not too complex -
just stand behind the counter, hand out golf balls and putters 
and collect money - so Chip should be easily able to handle 
the job. 
John can't pay a lot for this position and he worries that Chip 
might be tempted with all that cash - plus, there is almost no 
way to monitor the cash drawer and protect from petty theft 
when John's not there. 
Chip is a genuinely friendly, very articulate and outgoing guy 
- so John knows that Chip should be able to handle customers 
well. 
Chip looks and dresses like a hippy — he seldom shaves and 
has long hair well past his shoulders and keeps a generally 
scruffy appearance — so John worries that family-based 
customers may find Chip's appearance a little off-putting. 
When given a choice between hiring a friend or hiring a 
stranger, John knows he'd rather hire a friend, like Chip, as 
you would get more loyalty out of a friend than someone you 
don't really know. 
John has seen Chip burn friends before - and, even though 
they continue to have a great friendship, wonders if Chip 
could someday let him down. 
John sees Chip walking up the sidewalk to the golf course. 
John now has to decide what to tell him as to whether or not 







































Chip approached John warmly and shook his hand. Chip asked 
if John. Had "thought about his proposition." 
When Chip asked that, John said yes he'd been thinking a lot 
about it... John paused for a moment and then made up his 
mind. 
John smiled and said "Okay - you can start this weekend if you 
want." 
Chip thanked John for the opportunity. The two worked out the 
details and Chip filled out a few legal forms. 
Chip, as he walked away said to John that he appreciated the 
chance and that "I won't let you down." 
Chip started work that weekend and showed up on time for 
work every day. 
Chip stayed late as necessary, was reliable and was one of the 
hardest workers that John had ever employed at the course. 
At the end of the season, Chip got an end of season bonus in 
appreciation for his hard work and reliability throughout the 
season. 




































Chip approached John warmly and shook his hand. Chip asked 
if John. Had "thought about his proposition." 
When Chip asked that, John said yes he'd been thinking a lot 
about it... John paused for a moment and then made up his 
mind. 
John smiled and said "Okay - you can start this weekend if you 
want." 
Chip thanked John for the opportunity. The two worked out the 
details and Chip filled out a few legal forms. 
Chip, as he walked away said to John that he appreciated the 
chance and that "I won't let you down." 
Chip started work that weekend and initially things went well. 
Then Chip became less reliable, coming in late and sometimes 
not showing up at all. 
After a few weeks money began to be noticeably and 
unaccountably missing at the end of the shift. John became 
suspicious of Chip. 
After the cash shortages went on for about a week, John placed 
a hidden video camera behind the counter and caught Chip 
pocketing $20 bills. 
Chip was confronted with the evidence and fired on the spot. 
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